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ABSTRACT
SEARCHING UNDER STRESS: ANXIETY AND SELECTIVE
INFORMATION EXPOSURE
by
Melissa K. Surawski
University of New Hampshire, September, 2007

For centuries, political philosophers have argued that emotion clouds rational
judgment and should be avoided at all costs. In light of advances made in the fields of
social cognition, political science, and social psychology, however, the question of how
affective states work in conjunction with cognitive processes has been approached anew,
and interesting patterns have emerged in the data. They theory o f affective intelligence
(Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) posits that emotional arousal, particularly anxiety,
alerts organisms to gather and evaluate information from the environment that can be
useful for self-protection. On the other hand, terror management theory (Solomon,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002) predicts that anxious individuals will protect
themselves from information that is death-related or that threatens their worldview. The
primary purpose of this study was to determine if preference for information exposure
changes following a threat Anxiety was manipulated through faux online news articles
about nuclear terrorism. After reading the articles, participants spent time exploring a
website that contained links to further information about terrorism, some of which
reassured the participants of their safety, some of which further threatened their sense of
well-being. The order in which the links were clicked and the amount of time spent on
each webpage was recorded for each participant Additionally, participants completed
x
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the Need for Evaluation Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996), the Miller Behavioral Style Scale
(Miller, 1987), and the Brief Big Five Personality Inventory (Gosling, Renfrew, & Swann,
2003) in order to assess individual differences. Allhough anxiety increased for
participants reading an unsafe message about nuclear power, no differences were found
between the experimental groups in their preference for information. Overall,
participants strongly preferred threatening information, spending roughly three times as
long on the threatening websites than on reassuring websites. While high scores on the
Need for Evaluation scale predicted less time spent on the threatening websites, the other
individual difference measures failed to predict level of information exposure. Overall,
the results of this study indicate that following a threat, the preference for information
that further heightens anxiety is stronger than the preference for information that would
assuage fear.

xi
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

American citizens experienced tremendous emotional upheaval from a series of
events that began with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
in the fall o f 2001 and came to include the mailing o f anthrax to members o f Congress,
thirteen sniper attacks on innocent bystanders in the Washington, D.C. area, and a war in
Afghanistan. Shortly after, the debate over the invasion o f Iraq, which centered around
the security threat posed by Saddam Hussein, came to dominate media airwaves. By the
time the 2004 presidential campaign season had begun, political scientists, pundits,
psychologists, and the lay public alike wondered how the new focus on homeland
security would impact voters’ decisions. In fact, this question contributed to the attempt
by pollsters to predict the vote outcomes o f a newly identified set o f swing voters “security moms” - whose concern with national security not only closed the gender gap
in attitudes toward military spending, but even took precedence over their concern with
civil liberties (Tumulty, Novak, Barnes, Baron, Bower, Camey, Healy, Sieger, &
Underwood, 2003). Just as the question o f how these women would behave after their
political habits were abandoned in favor o f rational information processing that enabled
them to choose the candidate who could keep their families safe, the question o f how
voters would react in the face o f another terrorist attack occurring immediately before the
elections was also raised. Some speculated that a second attack preceding the election

1
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would highlight incumbent George W. Bush’s incompetence and failure to protect the
nation, while others argued that such an attack would again result in the same wave of
nationalism and support for the President that occurred after the 2001 attacks. In short, a
consensus that fear and anxiety would somehow influence the behavior o f voters seemed
to exist, but an understanding o f exactly how these emotions would influence their
thoughts and behavior remained elusive.
O f course, the intersection o f emotion and reason in the domain o f politics has
been a question o f concern before the socio-political events occurring at the inception of
the second millennium. Anaxagoras, some time around 450 B.C.E., posited that emotions
hinder the search for truth, and that the mind can and should prevent passion from
affecting thought and behavior. This ideal served as the basis for the doctrine o f stoicism
which came to dominate the history o f Western political thought (Marcus, Neuman, &
MacKuen, 2000). Political theorists, particularly enlightenment thinkers such as Locke
and Rousseau, have celebrated the human capacity to weigh the positive and negative
consequences of a variety o f possible actions in a logical manner, and argued for the
formation o f social institutions that allow citizens the freedom to use this capacity. These
thinkers - and the founders of modem democracies that they, in turn, influenced believed that civic engagement should involve a careful and deliberate search for
unbiased information about political issues, a period o f reflection during which the
information is evaluated, and then finally a decision about which course o f action (i.e.,
voting for a particular candidate) would best meet the goals o f the individual. Even
today, the idea o f human beings as efficient and rational information processors is
prevalent in political science and economics. However, this view o f cognition is only a

2
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prescription and, given the research findings in cognitive psychology and related
disciplines, not likely to be accurate.
In the late 1940s and 1950s, Herbert Simon challenged the idea that people
attempt to maximize their self-interest by logically evaluating all available information
and making decisions accordingly (e.g., Simon, 1955). To appreciate his point, consider
for a second the amount o f information that is available in the environment during a
typical election campaign. Not only are there multiple candidates concurrently vying for
seats in multiple elections, there are multiple issues on which the candidates can vary. It
would be beyond the capacity o f working memory to consider every piece o f information
to which an individual was exposed, let alone to evaluate this information against the
individual’s goals along with the consideration o f the probability that certain
consequences would result from the action taken. A person trying to decide between John
Kerry and George W. Bush in 2004, for example, would have to know where each
candidate stood on a number o f issues, determine which candidate’s positions are most
aligned with his or her own positions, all while weighing the likelihood that significant
change on the issue could occur over the time span in which the chosen candidate was in
office. O f course, pen and paper could be used in order to help summarize the
information, but that would require a degree o f motivation that probably does not
characterize most voters. Instead, Simon contended that the process o f human judgment
can best be described as “satisficing” - the attempt to identify an outcome that may
satisfy but will at least suffice to meet some objective.
In 1964, Philip Converse, pulling on Simon’s theory o f bounded rationality, wrote
an influential chapter in which he identified further restrictions on voter’s ability to make
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carefully reasoned decisions about which candidates to support.. Psychological
constraints such as the framing o f political messages in terms o f superordinate values (for
example, “social justice”) could enable voters to bind together a multitude o f attitudes
and beliefs that may not entirely be consistent with each other. Additionally, social
constraints such as the simplified way in which political information is presented to the
public will also affect how political information is encoded and evaluated in the minds of
voters.
Merely a few years after the publication o f Converse’s chapter, Kahneman and
Tversky (1982) began their ground-breaking work on the identification o f the biases and
heuristics prevalent in human cognition that constrain rationality. Experimental studies
demonstrated that people prefer risky political candidates when potential policy outcomes
are described as gains, while risk-averse candidates are more popular when these same
policy outcomes are presented in terms o f losses. Similarly, support for the Equal Rights
Amendment was stronger among experimental participants who read a description that
framed the amendment in terms o f eliminating discrimination (a loss frame), than among
participants who read a description that framed the issue in terms o f improving women’s
rights (a gain frame). Furthermore, when experimental participants were presented with a
description o f a policy currently in place and a proposed amendment to that policy, they
overwhelmingly chose to keep the status quo - regardless o f which policy was described
as current and which policy was described as the amendment (Quattrone & Tversky,
1988). Clearly, these and similar findings present a challenge to the prescriptive models
o f rational political thought.

4
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Another challenge to the classical ideal o f the rational political actor is the
influence o f emotion. Throughout the history o f Western thought, passion has been
viewed as an agent that serves only to corrupt logic - a force that distracts and misleads
the mind away from rationality. This view o f emotion, though, like the view that civic
engagement should be based on reason is also merely an ideology, and fails to describe
the processes that actually underlie political cognition. To assume that people do not
allow their emotions to affect their thinking simply because philosophers have
condemned it is to misunderstand the nature o f human cognition. In 1971, Carroll Izard
wrote:
“In general, emotions [have been viewed] as transient and troublesome
states serving no really important purpose. The rational man ideology
has succeeded in hiding from man his full nature.. .the human being is
neurophysiological, motoric, emotional, and cognitive. To drop out
any o f these components would be to make the organism less than
human, not more than human, as the rational man ideology puts it” (p.
396).
In order to advance the understanding o f political cognition, then, its nature as
both boundedly rational and emotional must be recognized. However, the traditional
conception of the interplay o f emotion and reason must be re-examined. Instead of
hindering rationality, emotion can be viewed as an aid to it. If learning information about
multiple candidates, issues, and elections is a substantial cognitive burden, then citizens
may decide to gather this information only when they are sufficiently motivated to do so.
What drives this motivation is emotional investment with the issues. In other words,
feeling strongly about an issue may not preclude the ability to think rationally, it instead
may motivate an individual to search for and evaluate information. Passion may not be
the enemy o f reason.

5
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Interestingly, two theories have been advanced in the psychology and political
science literatures regarding the role o f emotion as a motivating factor in the search for
and evaluation o f further information about an issue. Central to both theories is the
motivating power o f anxiety. While one theory - the theory o f affective intelligence,
(Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000) - posits that anxiety is the friend o f reason and
motivates citizens to learn and engage, the other, terror management theory (Pyszczynski,
Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003) is more aligned with the classical position that strong
emotions cloud judgment. This latter theory is intuitively appealing on account o f the
many examples that can easily be brought to mind o f people being “carried away” by
their emotions. Think, for instance, o f radical pro-life activists who so fervently believe
that fetuses have a right to life that they are willing to kill clinic staffers - an action that
does not logically follow from the belief that life should be protected. Furthermore, the
conjecture that anxiety debilitates rational thought is consistent with the backlash
movement toward “moral values” that occurred after the string o f anxiety-provoking
events that began with the attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Some political
theorists have attributed the movement toward the right to an increased psychological
need to affirm that the world operates in predictable ways that can be understood and
controlled.
The present study, then, is an attempt to reconcile these two competing theories
about the role o f affect - specifically, anxiety - on the motivation to seek out and evaluate
information about a political issue. Although both the theory o f affective intelligence and
the terror management theory have received considerable attention in the fields o f
political science and psychology respectively, to date, they have not been empirically
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compared. In the following pages, both theories will be described in detail and their
relevant literatures will be reviewed. Next, methodological issues common to both bodies
o f literature will be discussed, and ways in which these issues can be addressed will be
proposed. Finally, the possibility that quantifiable individual differences exist on the
ability o f anxiety to motivate behavior will be addressed, along with the implications that
these differences, if found, would have on the predictive validity o f each theory. A
comprehensive understanding cannot be achieved, however, without first reviewing the
emotion literature that was used to formulate the current theories o f emotion and political
behavior.

Emotion
For the first time in 1998, the Handbook o f Social Psychology included a chapter
on emotion. In the opening paragraphs, Robert Zajonc bemoans two aspects o f the
history of emotion research; first, emotion researchers are more likely to approach the
topic from within the context o f their own sub-discipline: developmentalists are
interested in understanding emotional development and regulation; social psychologists
might be interested in the influence o f affect on social behavior, such as in mobs or
crowds; while cognitive psychologists might study the impact o f emotion on memory.
Since emotion researchers are coming at the problem o f understanding emotion from very
specific backgrounds and seek to answer very specific questions, the nature o f the
literature on emotions is patchy, somewhat disorganized, and fails to offer a
comprehensive theory. Second, Zajonc bemoans the relative paucity o f work that has
been done on emotion. These two points prompt Zajonc to argue that the entire contents

7
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o f his chapter and each o f the references contained within it are needed to achieve only
the most basic understanding o f the function, structure,, and effects o f emotion.
Nevertheless, such a definition is not practical, and so I will adopt Caroll Izard’s
definition o f emotion: “An emotion is experienced as a feeling that motivates, organizes,
and guides perceptions, thoughts, and actions” (Izard, 1991, p. 14). The motivating power
o f emotion directs action toward some goal; in rage, for example, the goal might be to
remove the source o f frustration, while in disgust the goal might be to retreat from a
potentially toxic stimulus. Feeling a particular emotion will also color experience. To a
sad individual, there is no end to morose events, while a happy individual may perceive
delight in almost anything she encounters. The theory o f how emotions evolved will help
to illuminate these functional components o f emotion.
Emotion is believed by many to have evolved from approach-avoidance reactions
shared by even the simplest forms o f life (Izard, 1991). The abilities to discern danger
from sustenance and to repel from or approach them are important for survival, well
being, and reproduction. Emotions gradually evolved with phylogenetic complexity,
which requires longer periods o f time for an organism to reach maturity. Infants’ ability
to communicate their internal state to their caretakers by crying, for example, increases
the chances that their physiological needs will be met, while smiling and cooing cements
the emotional bond between infant and caretaker, further ensuring that the infant will
receive attention and care. Some argue, then, that infants’ dependence on others
contributed to the development o f discrete emotions. This evolutionary theory o f
emotion has been supported by the finding that people o f seemingly all cultures can
recognize and identify the emotions associated with particular facial expressions

8
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(Darwin, 1899; Izard, 1971; Ekman & Friesen, 1978), suggesting a common biological
heritage.
While most researchers would contend that emotions have evolved to help
organisms meet their physiological needs, there is not much consensus on the way
emotions are structured or their specific functions. For the sake o f brevity, the only
approaches to understanding the structure o f emotion to be discussed here will be those
that receive the most attention and support in the literature, the dimensional approach and
the differential approach (for a review o f psychoanalytic theories o f emotion, see Shapiro
& Emde, 1993; for a review o f self-theories see Dweck, 1991; for a review o f the
cognitive theories literature see Lazarus, 1995).
The dimensional theories o f emotion have in common the position that emotions
can be located on one or more continua. Spencer (1890, as cited in Izard, 1979), the first
to argue this point, claimed that all emotions fell along a single pleasantnessunpleasantness dimension. Later, Wundt (1896, as cited in Izard, 1979) included
Spencer’s demarcation in his own three-factor dimensional theory which also included
the dimensions o f relaxation-tension and calm-excitement. Duffy’s (1962) theory
includes a dimension o f arousal, similar to Wundt’s dimension o f calm-excitement, and a
positive-negative dimension. More recently, Russell (1980), Larsen and Diener (1992)
and Reisenzein (1994) have found evidence suggesting that emotions fall along two
dimensions, one o f pleasure-displeasure and one o f energy that ranges from sleep to
frenetic arousal. Watson and Tellegren (1985) also proposed independent positive and
negative dimensions along with an activation dimension.

9
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Despite the differences, some researchers are beginning to argue that a great deal
o f overlap exists in the dimensions across theories (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1999;
Yik, Russell, & Barrett, 1999), and that the dimensions are simply labeled differently. In
fact, James Russell (2003) has recently argued that many o f the differences that exist
among dimensional theories can be traced back to semantics - that the words that we use
to describe emotion are not differentiated enough to cover the entire range o f affective
experiences. To illustrate this point, he describes the very different types o f fear in the
same individual, Alice. First she encounters a bear in the woods, is frightened, and flees
to safety. In another example, Alice is sitting in a theatre watching the movie Alien. She
is frightened, but she is fully absorbed in the movie and does not run from it. In another
iteration, Alice is afraid that she will miss her flight and so she speeds toward the airport.
These situations all seem to represent different phenomenological experiences of
approach and avoidance, yet they can all be described by the word “fear.”
Critics o f this approach, then, argue that the use o f common language constrains
the scientific understanding of emotion. As an alternative, many researchers who do not
work within the context o f the dimensional theories are likely to support a discrete or
basic approach to emotion. These theories are characterized by the belief that each
emotion is its own unique physiological and phenomenological state.
Ekman (1999) has outlined the characteristics that define basic emotions. First,
basic emotions must have distinctive universal signals. Basic emotions can be
nonverbally communicated and understood in all cultures, which does seem to be the
case. Second, specific physiological arousal patterns must exist for each o f the basic
emotions, although Ekman concedes that the evidence is still converging on this point.

10
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Third, a sub-conscious appraisal system must exist that arouses the particular emotion in
response to a stimulus, again a point that needs to be further researched but is supported
by several theorists’ adoption o f this point in their own explanations o f basic emotions.
Fourth, there must be some common elements to the situations that arouse the basic
emotions, a logical conjecture that has found support in studies, for example, that have
found that the loss o f loved ones causes sadness across cultures.
Ekman’s own list of basic emotions includes anger, disgust, fear, joy, sadness,
and surprise. Izard (1971) includes anger, disgust, contempt, distress, fear, guilt, interest,
joy, shame, and surprise. Frijda (1986) argues that desire, happiness, interest, surprise,
wonder, and sorrow comprise the basic emotions, while Plutchik’s (1962) list contains
acceptance, anger, anticipation, disgust, joy, fear, sadness, and surprise. Generally, these
researchers believe that the basic emotions combine in various ways to produce the vast
range o f human emotional experience.
It appears that the discrete theorists work largely separately from the dimensional
theorists in the attempt to understand the structure o f emotion. Little overlap can be found
in the literature. Feldman Barrett and Russell (1999), who work within the dimensional
approach, suggested that emotions might be experiences comprised o f many distinct
processes that originate in different parts o f the brain, and the experience o f feeling a
particular emotion is the result o f the integration o f these processes. This view likely
represents the starting point for both the dimensional and discrete theories o f emotion,
and so perhaps abiding by Russell’s suggestion to inhibit the use o f common language in
emotion research will establish a common ground in the literature.

11
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Another problem related to structure o f emotion is the issue o f state and trait
emotion. Some emotional experiences are fleeting, while others last for significantly
longer periods o f time (Cattell & Scheier, 1961). Although state and trait emotion are not
thought to differ in their phenomenological experience, state emotion is thought to have a
greater range o f intensity than trait emotion. Izard (1991) argued that trait emotion may
be due to low neurological thresholds for particular emotions. Although the present study
is primarily interested in state emotion, it will be necessary to measure and control for
participants’ levels o f trait emotion.
Emotions have a variety o f physiological and psychological effects.
Physiologically, emotion activates the autonomic nervous system which releases
hormones and other messengers which, in turn, have a variety o f further influences,
including the speeding up or slowing down o f breathing and the heart, among other
things. These changes help the body respond quickly to threat (Frijda, 1988). There is
also substantial evidence that emotional state can influence the functioning o f the
immune system. Prolonged periods o f stress or negative emotion are associated with
decreased immune functioning (Ader & Cohen, 1985).
Emotion can have effects at the perceptual level as well. In a now classic study,
Izard, Naglar, Randally, & Fox (1965) staged either a pleasant or unpleasant encounter
with an experimenter before showing participants faces exhibiting positive or negative
expressions in a stereoscope (a device that allows a separate image to be viewed by each
eye). Participants who were experiencing negative emotion from the unpleasant
encounter reported seeing more faces with negative expressions, while the opposite
pattern was true for participants who experienced a pleasant encounter.

12
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Questions about the effect o f emotion on cognition have generated much research.
Cognitive psychologists have found evidence that individuals encode new information
into an associative network that contains information about his or her current affective
state; better recall, therefore, is expected for information when the individual is in a
similar mood to the time when the information was initially encoded (Bower, 1981). Isen
(1987) found that positive emotional states are more conducive for thinking creatively.
The literature on the impact o f emotion on cognition is large, and more o f it will
be reviewed with specific reference to anxiety within the specific discussions o f the
theory o f affective intelligence and terror management theory. To summarize this brief
overview o f the emotion literature: there is much disagreement over the structure o f
emotion, but most theorists agree that it has evolved to help organisms prepare to fight,
flight, mate, or care for offspring, all activities that enhance survival o f the species.
Emotion has been found to have pervasive physiological and cognitive effects, and much
more research is needed in order to fully understand these effects, particularly research
that incorporates methodology beyond simple reaction time measures in order to facilitate
understanding o f how anxiety influences more complex cognitive tasks, such as choosing
news media. Although more work on emotion is needed, affective intelligence and terror
management theorists have both drawn on the emotion literature to support their ideas; in
the following pages their theories will be presented, along with relevant studies that
support or disconfirm their hypotheses.
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The Theory of Affective Intelligence
In 1993, political scientists George Marcus and Michael MacKuen published a
paper in American Political Science Review in which they presented support for the
hypothesis that two different emotions - anxiety and enthusiasm - had very different
influences on perception and behavior.
Drawing from an evolutionary perspective in which anxiety is considered to be
adaptive on account o f its ability to motivate organisms to attend to their environment,
thus enabling them to detect danger, Marcus and MacKuen were attempting to test the
hypothesis that feeling anxious about political events and candidates will motivate
citizens to search for further information about them. Using data from the 1980 American
National Election Studies (ANES), these authors were able to produce four significant
findings:
First, they demonstrated that anxiety and enthusiasm for learning political
information and engaging in politics are separate and distinct emotional responses to
candidates. The 1980 ANES asked respondents if each o f the presidential candidates had
ever made them felt “angry”, “hopeful”, “afraid o f him”, “proud”, “disgusted”,
“sympathetic toward him”, and “uneasy.” Although anxiety was not one o f the adjectives
included by the ANES staff, Marcus and MacKuen reasoned that the terms afraid,
uneasy, anger, and disgust would approximate the affective state they were trying to
capture. Factor analysis with varimax rotation o f a principal factor solution did reveal
two factors that were consistent with their hypotheses: one factor was correlated with the
terms hopeful, proud, and sympathetic toward the candidate, and a second factor
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correlated with the terms anger, afraid, disgust, and unease. If these two factors were
merely opposite endpoints o f the same approach-avoidance continuum, then they would
not be expected to relate orthogonally to each other. In fact, however, they do. Marcus
and MacKuen interpreted this finding as disconfirming evidence for a simple valence
view o f emotion.
In order to test further hypotheses that anxiety and enthusiasm have different
effects on behavior, the question o f how closely the emotions o f private citizens are
related to socio-political events had to be addressed first. After all, if there was no
relation between reported affect and concurrent political events, any attempt to measure
the effect o f emotion on the learning o f political information would be superfluous. This
question o f whether or not citizens experience emotional reactions that change along with
the political landscape comprised the second study o f Marcus and M acKuen’s 1993
paper. The authors tracked the rate at which each o f the emotional terms (the same terms
used in the first study) were volunteered by respondents participating in three different
waves o f the ANES, and found significant changes in levels o f perceived enthusiasm and
anxiety about each candidate corresponded closely with a number o f events relative to the
campaign. For example, in January 1980, 40% o f the ANES respondents volunteered
terms such as uneasy or disgusted to describe their emotional reactions to Carter.
Following an inflation scare, rising unemployment levels, and the hostage crisis,
however, the number o f respondents reporting they felt uneasy or disgusted increased to
53%.
Experimental evidence supports the existence o f emotional reactions to political
events as well. Marcus, Wood, and Theiss-Morse, (1998) presented subjects with
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information about political groups that they had previously described as being offensive.
The participants were then presented with different messages about the types o f activities
that the group engaged in: one message portrayed the actions as orderly and responsible,
while the other message described the actions o f the group as violent and unruly. After
the participants were exposed to the message, they were asked to complete a mood scale.
Additionally, some o f the participants provided physiological measurements o f their
arousal. As predicted, the participants who were exposed to the violent and unruly
message reported (and demonstrated physiologically) higher levels o f anxiety and arousal
than participants who had been exposed to the benign message.
Once anxiety and enthusiasm were demonstrated to be distinct emotional systems
and that citizens do, indeed, experience them in reaction to political events, the
hypothesis that anxiety and enthusiasm have different motivational effects on political
behavior could be tested. In Marcus and MacKuen’s third study, vote choice was
regressed on anxiety and enthusiasm scores. In all three waves o f the 1980 ANES,
enthusiasm for the candidate predicted vote choice, but anxiety did not have an effect.
These two emotions, then, do not appear to function the same way as enthusiasm in
political cognition.
In their fourth study, Marcus and MacKuen tested the hypothesis that feeling
anxious is associated with decreased identification with a political party. According to
evolutionary theory, anxiety is triggered by a perceived threat in the environment and
disrupts ongoing activity so that the organism can re-allocate resources to self-protection.
Feeling anxious about politics, Marcus and MacKuen argued, should motivate the voter
to decrease his or her reliance on party identification as an automatic method for
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assessing political beliefs, and increase the search for objective information. A
regression model built to test this hypothesis, did, in fact, reveal this pattern in the data:
anxious voters are less likely to rely on habit. Furthermore, respondents who reported
feeling anxious about the candidates were also more likely to correctly place Reagan to
the right of Carter on three policy issues, a finding that demonstrates the motivation to
seek out and learn new information.
To summarize their findings, then, Marcus and MacKuen demonstrated the
distinct effect o f two different emotions - enthusiasm and anxiety - on how people
approach politics. Feeling enthusiastic about a candidate motivates people to vote and
participate in politics, while feeling anxious motivates people to spend more time and
energy learning about political events. The major contribution o f these studies, then, is
twofold: first, they provided some o f the first empirical evidence that emotion does
affect how individual citizens react to political information - regardless o f the rational
man ideology sustained by political philosophers for centuries. Second, they implied that
the classical view o f emotion as detrimental to rational thought is incorrect; instead,
heightened anxiety seems to prod the voter into more deliberate consideration o f the
information available to him or her in the environment.
Marcus and M acKuen’s paper has received considerable attention in the field of
political psychology. It has been included in a number o f collections o f classic readings,
such as the Oxford Handbook o f Political Psychology edited by Sears, Huddy, and Jervis
(2003), recent compilation edited by Jost and Sidanius (2004), among other appearances
in edited books and annual reviews. The paper, not surprisingly, has also been central to
the careers o f the authors, who have expanded their original 1993 findings about the
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function o f emotion in political behavior into a comprehensive theory, the theory of
affective intelligence.
Affective intelligence may seem like an odd name for a theory that attempts to
describe the impact o f emotional reactions on specifically political behavior - particularly
given the separate and distinct research on emotional intelligence which has been o f
interest to personality psychologists. What George Marcus, Michael MacKuen, and their
colleague Russell Neuman hoped to express with that title is the idea that emotion and
reason are not mutually exclusive; that affect can enhance intelligent thinking (Marcus,
Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000).
The theory, essentially, is as follows: two different neurological sub-systems
exist within the limbic systems that regulate conscious awareness. The first system,
labeled the disposition system, has two functions. First, it is the seat o f procedural
memory for automatic, habitual behaviors. Second, it monitors the ability o f the body to
meet the demands that are being placed on it. It notices, for example, the level o f energy
that is available to be consumed and the relative difficulty o f the task at hand. When the
disposition system has determined that the organism can effectively perform the task,
emotions o f satisfaction and enthusiasm are aroused in the individual. However, when
the disposition has detected that there is a mismatch between the amount o f resources
needed and the amount o f resources available to complete the task, feelings o f depression
and frustration are aroused. These feelings are adaptive because they prevent the
organism from engaging in behavior that may ultimately be harmful to it. Take, for
example, a runner who is training for the marathon. It is unlikely that she will be able to
run the full 26 miles on the exact day that she decides to take up running, and if she were
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to force her body to do so, she would likely end up injured. Marcus, Neuman, and
MacKuen (2000) argue that the disposition system enables the runner to experience
frustration and despair that signals she should not attempt to run 26 miles, and she would
stop before her body is harmed. The disposition system, then, underlies the experience
and motivation associated with the emotion o f enthusiasm, which in turn enables the
organism to know when to engage in a task and when to quit.
The dispositional system is relevant to the study o f political behavior because it
describes the conditions under which citizens will participate in politics. When they are
feeling particularly enthusiastic about a candidate because that candidate seems
especially able to deliver desired outcomes, citizens will be more likely to go to the polls
or wave a sign on a street comer. They feel enthusiastic about politics because they have
sensed that their goals can be met by a particular candidate or political group. On the
other hand, citizens will fail to turn out on Election Day if they fail to perceive the
candidates as being able to deliver the outcomes in which they are interested. In this
scenario, citizens become frustrated by the government’s inability to meet their needs,
and for this reason, voting is pointless.
The dispositional system cannot be the only system exerting an effect on political
behavior, however. If it were, election results could be easily predicted by the degree of
enthusiasm that various candidates and groups inspire in their constituents, and the
emotional reactions to specific political events would ultimately have no effect. Attempts
to persuade voters to reconsider their habitual positions would be fruitless because there
would be no mechanism that would disrupt their reliance on habit and indicate to them
that new information in the environment should be attended to and evaluated. And so,
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Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen describe the second neurological subsystem relevant to
the theory o f affective intelligence.
The surveillance system, like the disposition system, assesses whether or not the
organism can afford to engage in some activity. Instead o f weighing the ratio o f
resources available to the resources needed, however, the surveillance system determines
how much attention the organism can devote to the task at hand. The surveillance system
constantly monitors the environment for any signs o f threatening stimuli. When a threat is
detected, the emotion o f anxiety is aroused, and the attention o f the organism is redirected
from the task at hand to the environment so that preparation for fight or flight can be
made. The shift in attention to the environment is evolutionarily adaptive because it
fosters the desire to seek out information that can be used for self-preservation purposes.
For example, consider a student studying for an examination in the university library,
where many distracting signs that danger is imminent are unlikely to occur. The student’s
surveillance system will allow him to devote all o f his attention to the book that he is
reading. On the other hand, consider the same student driving home for the winter break
during a snowstorm. The student may have difficulty carrying on a conversation with a
passenger because his attention is diverted by the treacherous road conditions. He may
lower the volume o f his stereo, drive more slowly, pay closer attention to where other
cars are positioned on the road and the speed o f those cars. Although he may be
interested in what the passenger is saying, the surveillance system will not allow him to
ignore the details o f the environment that may be potentially dangerous to him.
The theory of affective intelligence argues that in politics, any sign that an event
or candidate might be potentially harmful should cause the surveillance system to trigger
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feelings o f anxiety. This anxiety, in turn, should alert the individual and motivate a
search for information. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen, then, argue that an electorate
made up o f anxious voters would be most similar to the classical ideal o f the rational
citizen. Although it may seem that an anxious but rational populace would benefit
participative democracy, it should be noted that the constant search for information is
taxing. Having to spend large amounts o f time learning about socio-political events
would prohibit involvement in other activities necessary for survival and procreation, and
being kept in a continual state o f anxious arousal would also take its toll, both
psychologically and physiologically.
This is why human emotion is hypothesized to have evolved into a dual-system
(Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; LeDoux, 1995). While one system scans the
environment for potentially threatening stimuli, the other system, in a sense, determines
what sorts o f stimuli should be regarded as threatening. Consider a concrete example: the
disposition system o f an individual deeply committed to the preservation o f abortion
rights has signaled to her that she has the available resources to participate in the debate
and activism over this issue, which (for some reason in her socialization history) is
important to her. She feels enthusiastic because she feels that she is able to make a
difference, and that her work is worthwhile. When she hears that a nominee for Supreme
Court Justice described as having anti-abortion stands by the media, her surveillance
system notes the threat to her wellbeing, and anxiety is aroused. She then is motivated to
learn as much as she can about the nominee and the actions that can be taken to prevent
his confirmation. The extent that she will participate in activities organized to block the
nominee will depend on how effective she feels her actions will be. If she feels that
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joining other protesters will help raise awareness and gamer support for their position,
then her enthusiasm and likelihood o f participation will also increase. If she feels that
participating in rallies would be pointless on account o f the likelihood that they would
fail to engender further support, her enthusiasm will decrease and she is less likely to act.
On the other hand, an individual who is not interested in the abortion issue at all (again,
because o f his idiosyncratic socialization history) will not have considered what sorts o f
resources or actions are necessary for being an effective participant in the abortion
debate. This individual’s disposition system, then, will not keep track o f energy
demanded and energy expended on the issue, which prevents feelings o f enthusiasm for
the issue from being aroused. Without enthusiasm for the issue, information in the
environment about the Supreme Court nominee would fail to be interpreted as potentially
threatening to the individual’s wellbeing by the surveillance system. Anxiety would not
be aroused. The individual would fail to divert his attention to the issue, and learning
further information, let alone participating in demonstrations or discussions about the
nominee would be unlikely to happen.
The theory o f affective intelligence is intuitively compelling, and many analyses
o f ANES data collected between 1980 and 1986 support the conjecture that human
emotion is made up o f dual systems with distinct functions as opposed to a single
approach-avoidance typology (for a review o f these analyses, see Marcus, Neuman, &
MacKuen, 2000). These results o f these studies mirror Marcus and M acKuen’s original
1993 findings: enthusiasm and anxiety about the candidates vary in response to key
campaign events, are orthogonally related, and predict participation and vote choice,
respectively.
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Additionally, Marcus and MacKuen’s theory is similar to several theories in the
emotion literature. Mathews (1990, 1993) postulated that specific emotions signal to the
brain which types o f processes (i.e., threat detection) should be given first priority.
Eysenck (1992) has argued that general anxiety disorder is the result o f a
biological/cognitive tendency to be hypervigilant o f potential danger in the environment,
consistent with the idea o f an overactive surveillance system. Mogg & Bradley (1999)
proposed a cognitive-motivational view o f anxiety that drew heavily on LeDoux’s (1995)
neurological model o f anxiety. They propose that a “valence evaluation system” assesses
the threat level o f stimuli (again similar to the surveillance system) through the
integration o f various sources o f information. This information processing may begin in
the thalamus but comes to involve the amygdala, which in turn effects a variety o f
cognitive and perceptual processes, including a “goal engagement system” (similar to the
dispositional system) which determines if the individual has sufficient resources to
respond to the threat.
For the purpose o f this paper, the most important conjecture o f the theory of
affective intelligence is the prediction that anxiety causes attention to be shifted to the
environment so that threat information can be perceived and processed. A few
experimental findings support this view. When experimental subjects are presented with
an array that includes one angry face and many happy faces, they are significantly faster
at finding the angry face (a stimulus that appears to be inherently threatening) than
subjects who must find the single happy face in a crowd o f angry faces (Hansen &
Hansen, 1988). Additionally, evidence supporting the theory o f affective intelligence has
been found with techniques from cognitive psychology. Mogg, Bradley, MacNamara,
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Powys, Rawlinson, & Seiffer (2000) paired a neutral image with a disturbing image for
500 ms, and then had participants react by pressing a button when a dot appeared on the
screen. Participants responded significantly faster to the dot when it appeared in the
place where the disturbing image had been, suggesting that participants were
automatically drawn to these pictures. These findings have been replicated with words in
both clinical (generalized anxiety disorder) and normal samples using other pictures and
words as stimuli (see Mogg & Bradley, 1999, for a review). While these studies suggest
an automatic tendency to attend to threatening stimuli, the authors caution that the nature
of the experimental tasks are very simple and more research is needed using more
complex stimuli in order to understand how anxiety affects attention and processing in
the real world. While people may be automatically drawn to threatening images, it is not
yet understood if their attention continues to be sustained by them beyond a few hundred
milliseconds. In fact, Mogg and Bradley argue that, adaptively, low-trait anxiety
individuals may block low-threat stimuli so that their attention can be effectively focused
on the task at hand.
What is needed, then, to better inform both the psychological literature on
emotion and the political science literature on political behavior is studies that use more
complex, ecologically valid stimuli and take into account a number o f sociopsychological variables. Again, Marcus, Neuman, and M acKuen’s work on their theory
o f affective intelligence represents a good starting point for this collaboration.
One psychological variable that might contribute to the tendency to attend to the
political environment may be personal habit - individuals who tend to follow politics may
be more inclined to become anxious or enthusiastic about the candidates. In order to
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measure the effect o f emotions that have been aroused by the current political
environment, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen ran regressions that statistically controlled
for the impact o f individual variation in the tendency to attend to politics on reported
levels of campaign interest. Once personal habit was controlled for, the effects o f feeling
anxious and feeling enthusiastic on campaign interest both declined by about half.
However, to put this finding in perspective, 13 associated with feeling anxious was .10 and
13 for enthusiasm equaled .13, values similar to 13 = .11 and 13 = .12 for education level and
strength o f partisanship, respectively (effect sizes not available). The impact o f level of
arousal and emotion, then, is roughly comparable to the impact o f education level and
party identification on campaign interest. To summarize, a good portion o f the variance
in campaign interest is due to individual differences in political attentiveness. However,
the impact o f the emotions aroused by the current campaign also plays an important role
in engaging the public.
Interest in the campaign, however, is only half o f the story. Effective political
cognition is also comprised o f the search for new information about political events and
candidates - a search that will be motivated by anxiety. A good empirical test o f the
theory o f affective intelligence, then, should also include an analysis o f the effect o f
anxiety on the respondents’ ability to answer questions about current political affairs
correctly. For this test, Marcus, MacKuen, and Neuman used two outcome measures:
first, the number o f statements that respondents were able to provide about the candidates
was used, with the assumption that those individuals who paid more attention to the
campaign and learned more information would be able to recall more information than
respondents who paid less attention. Second, the ability o f the respondents to judge
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correctly which candidate was more liberal or conservative on a number o f issues was
used. When the amount of statements about a candidate was regressed on the emotional
responses o f the participants (controlling also for habitual political attentiveness,
education, and strength o f partisanship), the influence o f anxiety was twice as strong as
the influence o f enthusiasm. With the more rigorous test o f campaign knowledge, the
effect o f enthusiasm disappeared entirely, but again the effect o f anxiety remained
significant. Both o f these findings support the tenet central o f the theory o f affective
intelligence that anxiety motivates attention to the political environment.
Additionally, a counterintuitive hypothesis derived from the theory o f affective
intelligence was tested. Because anxiety is both provoked by perceived threats in the
environment and contributes to the monitoring for additional threats, the authors
hypothesized that strong partisans would be the first to notice signs o f trouble in the
administration that they support. Specifically, they conjectured that strong partisans
would report higher levels o f anxiety when their party was under fire for declining
economic conditions than members o f the opposing party. After all, these individuals
stand to lose the status quo in addition to the pride and reflected glory they may have felt
as part o f the dominant political party, and so would become more anxious at the thought
o f losing this special state than members o f the opposing party. A regression analysis
using ANES data collected during the 1980, 1984, 1992 and 1994 presidential campaigns
was conducted to evaluate the influence o f partisanship (strong democrat, strong
republican, and independent) on anxiety about economic conditions under the incumbent
president. The r2 value for independents was .86, and .82 for respondents that strongly
identified with the supporting party, while the r2 value for respondents who identified
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with the opposing party was only .28. Clearly, the results of this analysis indicate that
being a member o f the dominant party does not automatically result in feelings of
security and pride, as the approach/avoidance theory o f emotion would predict; instead, it
results in more intense negative affect when challenges to the status quo become
apparent.
Although Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen were able to provide empirical support
for their theory o f affective intelligence through a number o f different approaches, a few
critical flaws have not been addressed. Perhaps most importantly is their source o f data.
By using the ANES data set, the authors were constrained to the questions that were
posed to the respondents. Because this survey did not include a direct measure o f the
specific construct o f anxiety, Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen were forced to use a factor
that correlated with negative affect items, which may or may not be a proxy o f anxiety.
The same is true for the measurement o f enthusiasm. Because these constructs are central
to the theory, further work is needed that operationalizes and measures the constructs in a
more valid way.
Additional questions about the theory o f affective intelligence are raised by
findings in the social cognition literature. Eyesenck (1992) found that negative affect
states such as anxiety and depression are actually associated with a decrease in
performance on demanding cognitive tasks. Although a consensus has not yet been
reached on how negative affect influences cognitive processes (Matthews & Wells,
1999), Eysenck (1992) and Sarason (1984) have argued that the diversion o f attention
away from the task at hand and onto the self or the preoccupation with the anxiety is
likely involved. These findings from the field o f social cognition are more aligned with
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the findings advanced by psychologists Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom
Pyszczynski (1991) in their theory o f terror management.

Terror Management Theory
Just as Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen drew from evolutionary theory and the
neuroscience literature to create their theories about the disposition and surveillance
system, Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski also adopt an evolutionary perspective o f
human motivation. They argue that human beings, just as all animals, are instinctively
driven toward self-preservation. The motivation to avoid injury and death is genetically
based and strong. Unlike animals, however, human beings have the cognitive capacity to
understand and be aware o f death. In fact, the awareness that total annihilation o f the self
could occur at virtually any moment is a continual source of anxiety.
Several studies within the terror management framework have demonstrated that
participants distract themselves from death-related thoughts following an experimental
manipulation that makes their own death salient to them (Greenberg, Pyszczynski,
Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987,1982). For example,
Greenberg et al. (1994) induced mortality salience and then asked their participants to
work on a word completion task. This task was comprised of 20 word fragments that
could be completed as death-related or death-unrelated words. For example, “coff

”

could be completed as either “coffee” or “coffin”. If death-related thoughts were active
in working memory, individuals would be more likely to complete the words as deathrelated. H alf o f the participants in each condition completed this task after reading a
boring passage designed to distract them from the mortality salience they had just
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endured, while the other half completed the task immediately following the salience
induction. Participants completing the word task immediately following the mortality
salience induction created significantly less death-related words than the mortality
salience plus delay condition, suggesting a tendency to push death-related thoughts out of
mind as soon as possible.
Consistent with this interpretation are a variety o f studies looking at the effect of
cognitive load and avoidance o f death-related stimuli. Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon,
Pyszczynski, and Simon (1997) induced mortality salience in participants by having them
write down their thoughts about their own death. H alf o f the participants were then given
an 11-digit number, ostensibly to be remembered during a later part o f the study. The
participants who had the cognitive burden o f mentally rehearsing the number showed
increased activation o f death-related thoughts, as demonstrated on the same word
completion task used by Greenberg et al. (1994). These findings suggest that the
mortality salience induction activates death-related thoughts, and that cognitive resources
are necessary for suppressing them. The low number o f death-related words completed
by the control group that was not rehearsing the number suggests that when ample
cognitive resources are available, they are immediately used to push death-related
thoughts out o f conscious awareness.
The results o f these studies, and others like them lead Pyszczynski, Solomon, and
Greenberg (2003) to conclude that “the initial responses to mortality salience is to engage
in simple, direct, threat-focused defenses that enable the individual to get death-related
thoughts out o f consciousness” (p. 59). These researchers, then, would predict that
people are less likely to expose themselves to anxiety-provoking information when their
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deaths are made salient. Instead, individuals are likely to try to minimize the threat, by
avoiding information related to the threat, minimizing the apparent threat by altering
perceptions o f its severity, or denying vulnerability to the threat. Human beings,
according to these authors, need continual assurance that trauma is unlikely, and seek
refuge from the terrifying idea o f death. In addition to pushing death-related thoughts out
o f mind, another coping mechanism is culture.
Culture is central to terror management theory. Its developers argue that cultural
worldviews are constructed and internalized so that an individual can achieve a sense of
security by feeling as though he or she is a valuable member o f a meaningful community.
Instead o f consciously dwelling on the immanency o f death, humans instead become
preoccupied with the values o f the culture to which they belong. Because many cultures
give prominent roles to religious systems, individuals may take comfort in the idea that
adherence to the values prescribed by their culture will result in actual immortality in a
spiritual realm after physical death. But even for individuals who do not subscribe to
religious beliefs, something like immortality can be achieved through participation in the
larger culture, whether through children or even ideas that have left a mark on the world.
Solomon, Greenberg, and Pyszczynski posit that culture is understood through a
cognitive framework that underlies all psychological processes and serves two purposes:
first, it strongly motivates self-preservation, and second, it attempts to minimize distress
and anxiety about the world through the control o f conscious awareness and an
understanding o f the laws and forces that govern it. These authors argue that this
worldview is a fragile social construction that requires continuous maintenance to
function. The failure o f the worldview to defend the individual against existential angst
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would have serious repercussions for the emotional stability and cognitive functioning of
the individual; therefore, the way in which one understands the world must be continually
defended against threats.
Threats to the worldview may come in the form o f competing belief systems.
Exposure to convictions that run counter to those upheld by the individual make salient
the possibility that the individual’s worldview may not be valid. Furthermore, exposure
to other standards o f behavior and cultural values leads to uncertainty about one’s ability
to live up to these standards and values, which in turn compromises self-worth and
engenders anxiety. The doubt that is experienced when other worldviews are
encountered, along with the inevitable reminders that death could suddenly occur result
in a continual need for ongoing confirmation o f the validity o f the adopted worldview and
value as an individual.
In short, the developers o f terror management theory argue that threats to an
individual’s worldview will cause anxiety, which will in turn motivate that individual to
protect his or her worldview and self-esteem. This conjecture, coupled with the assertion
that individuals are motivated to push death-related thoughts out o f mind after death has
been made salient, asserts exactly the opposite o f the theory o f affective intelligence.
Instead of viewing anxiety as motivator for both the search for objective information and
the rational evaluation o f that information, terror management theory views anxiety as an
impediment to rationality, a force that not only halts the motivation to consider alternate
viewpoints, but actively guards against it. Terror management theory, then, would assert
that the anxiety aroused by exposure to different viewpoints in the political environment
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would only serve to strengthen the positions and viewpoints already held by the
individual citizen.
There is an abundance o f experimental evidence to support the conjecture that
individuals attempt to defend their worldview when made anxious. One o f the most
compelling studies examined the effect o f mortality salience on the tendency to
stereotype outgroup members (Schimel, Simon, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon,
Waxmonsky &Amdt, 1999). The experimental group o f participants was asked to fill out
a questionnaire that made them consider their own death, while the control group filled
out a questionnaire about dental hygiene (presumably a topic that would not arouse
anxiety). An African-American confederate was present while the participants filled out
the questionnaires. For half o f the participants, the confederate was dressed in clothing
consistent with the stereotype o f African Americans predominate in American culture
(i.e., “hip hop style” clothing), while for the other half o f the participants, the confederate
was dressed in a manner inconsistent with the cultural stereotype o f African Americans
(i.e, “preppy” clothing). After completing the questionnaires that served as the
experimental manipulation, the participants were asked to participate in a study on
impression formation, and wrote essays about the other person who had been present in
the laboratory with them. The results indicated that the participants in the mortality
salience condition provided more positive evaluations o f the African American
confederate when he confirmed predominant cultural stereotypes by wearing the hip hop
clothing than when he defied the cultural stereotype by wearing preppy clothes, while the
exact opposite was true for participants who did not undergo the mortality salience
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induction. These findings suggest that feeling anxious hinders objective information
processing.
A cognitive test o f the effect o f mortality salience on information processing was
provided by Arndt, Greenberg, and Cook (2002). Using word fragment completion tasks
and lexical decision tasks in order to determine the relative accessibility o f certain
constructs in memory, these researchers found that worldview-relevant constructs
(operationally defined as nationalistic statements) became activated for participants who
were primed with mortality salience words, but not for participants who were primed
with pain or failure words. These findings are consistent with the conjecture that anxiety
aroused over the prospect o f death can be mitigated by internalizing the cultural
worldview, and provide further evidence that negative affect interferes with an objective
search for information from the environment.
In addition to these two studies described above, the effects o f mortality salience
on worldview defense has been shown to effect a diverse range o f social psychological
phenomena, including feelings o f nationalism and patriotism (Greenberg, et al., 1990);
reporting o f political attitudes and beliefs (Pyszczynski, et ah, 1996); perception of
outgroup members (Greenberg, et ah, 1994; Nelson, Moore, Olivettie & Scott, 1997);
aggression (McGregor, 1998); risk taking (Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, & Mikulincer,
1999); prosocial behavior (Jonas, Schimel, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2002); ingroup
identification (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002; Dechesne, Janssen, & van
Knippenberg, 2000); desire for commitment in romantic relationships (Florian,
Mikulincer, & Hirschberger, 2002) and perceptions o f guilt in the legal system

33

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

(Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989), among other constructs
as well.
Terror management theorists argue that the extensive body o f literature on the
self-serving bias can be interpreted as evidence supporting terror management theory
(Pyszczynksi, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003). This literature has shown that threats to
self-esteem, such as being told that one has failed on a test o f some ability important to
the self-construct increase anxiety. Furthermore, these threats elicit self-protective
behavior in the participants. For example, participants may deny the importance o f that
particular ability to his or her sense o f self-worth, denigrate the test or the experimenter,
create or claim handicaps that disrupted their performance, inflate their descriptions of
their ability in other domains, and selectively seek information that enables them to
uphold a self-serving interpretation o f the failure (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon,
1986). Taken together, these findings again demonstrate that feeling anxious motivates
the defense o f the existing worldview.
Research by cognitive psychologists has also demonstrated that anxiety is
disruptive to efficient processing. Reed (1977) found that anxious participants show
deficits in their ability to reason inductively, while Fransson (1977) found that anxious
individuals exhibit shallow information processing. Memory effects are also welldocumented; Idzihowski & Baddeley (1987) found that anxious participants showed
significant decreases in working memory capacity compared to non-anxious individuals.
Kent (1985) demonstrated that anxious individuals tend to selectively remember negative
information. In an fMRI study, Erk, Kiefer, Grothe, Wunderlich, Spitzer, & Walter
(2003) found that state-anxious individuals showed poorer recall for lists o f neutral words
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compared with individuals in a positive or neutral mood state. Anxious individuals
showed increased activity in the amygdala while attempting to encode the word lists,
while positive-state and neutral-state participants showed increased activity in the
parahippocampus and prefrontal cortex, respectively.
Blascovich and his colleagues have shown that performance declines when
individuals appraise a difficult task as a threat rather than a challenge across a variety o f
situations (see Blascovich & Mendes, 2000, for a review). For example, female dog
owners were asked to perform a serial subtraction task alone, in the presence o f their dog,
or in the presence o f their best female friend. With the dog present, little or no
physiological changes occurred and the participants made few errors. Participants who
subtracted alone showed a physiological pattern (increased blood pressure) indicative o f a
threat appraisal and made significantly more errors, but not as many as the participants
who had a friend present. It seems that the added stress o f being evaluated by someone
on a difficult cognitive task raised anxiety and decreased cognitive efficiency. (The dog,
the experimenters speculated, caused the participants to feel secure in an attachment
sense, and this calming effect allowed for greater cognitive efficiency) (Allen,
Blascovich, Tomaka, & Kelsey, 1991). Eysenck (1992) argues that anxiety impairs
cognitive efficiency through an additional processing burden - anxious individuals
“worry” or have negative-affect laden thoughts or images activated in working memory
that impedes efficient processing o f other material.
Additionally, it appears that anxiety can also influence attention. MacLeod,
Mathews, & Tata (1986) presented subjects with pairs o f threat and neutral words on a
screen for a brief period and measured the time it took participants to respond to the
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presentation o f a dot after the words disappeared. Participants were faster when the dot
appeared closer to the neutral word, suggesting that they were automatically avoiding the
threat words. This finding is the complete opposite o f what Mogg et al. (2000) found
using a similar paradigm, with pictures instead o f words. In her study, participants were
automatically drawn toward the threat stimulus. Even with automatic responses to simple
stimuli, results conflict.

How, then, can the inconsistencies in the findings supporting the theory o f affective
intelligence and the terror management theory be reconciled? A look at some
methodological issues common to both studies provides an answer. While both theories
attempt to describe the influence o f anxiety on the search for and processing of
information, both theories use different operational definitions o f anxiety. The
researchers working on the theory o f affective intelligence, which has garnered more
attention in the political science literature than in the psychology literature, have relied on
large databases to test their theories. While this approach allows them to test their
hypotheses on thousands o f subjects, it denies them precise control over the
operationalization o f the construct they are attempting to study. Marcus, Neuman, and
MacKuen report consistent findings that their factor correlated with negative affect terms
and predicts behaviors and attitudes associated with a search for objective information, a
finding that requires and deserves further study in order to determine if this predictor is,
in fact, anxiety. Researchers in the terror management camp, on the other hand, have
narrowly defined anxiety to include mortality salience. While this type o f anxiety no
doubt exists in most people from time to time, it seems unlikely that a preoccupation with
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one’s own death is aroused each time an individual turns on the news channel. What is
needed, then, is a uniform, valid definition o f anxiety that mirrors an affective state that
could conceivably be aroused during naturally occurring media consumption.
Controlling the definition o f anxiety would allow for the direct comparison o f the theory
o f affective intelligence against terror management theory in order to determine which
hypothesis best describes the influence o f anxiety on information search behavior.
In addition to the inconsistencies with the way anxiety has been operationalized
and manipulated, the way it has been measured is problematic as well. The existing
studies have measured anxiety only once, after the participants have been exposed to the
anxiety-provoking stimulus, and have relied on self-report. A stronger methodology
would incorporate measurement before, during, and after exposure to anxiety-provoking
information in order to assess the effectiveness o f the manipulation, as well as use
behavioral measures.
Additionally, the existing studies have not tested the possibility that individual
differences exist in preferences for anxiety coping techniques, such as information
seeking. Research in the field o f health psychology, for example, has found that some
individuals about to undergo a painful procedure (vaginal colposcopy) feel less stress
when they are exposed to detailed information regarding the procedure, while for other
individuals, anxiety increases with information exposure (Miller, 1996). A similar effect
may exist in the processing o f political information as well - some individuals may feel
less threatened when they have more information about alarming socio-political events,
while others feel more overwhelmed and anxious when presented with detailed
information. Testing for the existence o f these differences and the variables that may
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mediate or moderate them, such as the ability to interpret and organize complex
information that may not be structured in a way that is most conducive to learning (as
suggested by Bar-Tal, 1994) would allow for more variance in political behavior in the
face o f frightening events to be explained.
The present study, then, advances the literature on political information seeking and
processing in the face of anxiety-provoking events in three ways: first, it provides a more
rigorous test o f each theory by introducing manipulation and measurement that is more
tightly controlled than the research that has been published on the topic to date.
Second, it directly tests the theory o f affective intelligence against terror
management theory, which has not yet been done in the political science or psychology
literature. Specifically, I hypothesize that participants will seek out more information and
demonstrate better recall for this information when they are made moderately anxious
about a particular event; that is, anxiety will motivate a search for information when a
threat is present, but not overwhelming. On the other hand, I hypothesize that high levels
of anxiety associated with a sense o f personal vulnerability will be associated with
decreased information search, poor recall for information content, and a reliance on
previously-held political attitudes and stereotyped information - hypotheses consistent
with the current findings on the disrupting effect anxiety has on higher-order cognitive
processes (Eyesenck, 1992). Participants with low levels o f anxiety arousal are expected
to show less preference for information exposure than both the medium and high anxiety
groups because their motivation to collect information should not be sufficiently piqued.
In short, I hypothesize that both theories are correct, depending upon the level o f anxiety
that the environmental context will arouse.
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Third, this study assesses effects o f individual differences in the ability to tolerate
anxiety, which may further our understanding o f the processes that mediate the search for
information under anxiety-provoking conditions. I predict that individual differences will
be found on the preference for more or less information about a threatening event, and
that these differences may be affected by demographic factors, such as level o f pre
existing knowledge about the threat, as well as psychological factors, such as the need for
cognition and anxiety. Taken together, the aim o f these research questions is to further
understand the process in which people gather the information that will serve as the basis
for their political decisions.
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CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Participants
Three hundred and two University o f New Hampshire undergraduates were
recruited from the Psychology Department’s subject pool to participate in the study
for course credit. The sample was comprised o f 68 males (22.51%), and 234 females
(77.48%). The mean age o f the participants was 19.48 years, with a standard
deviation o f 1.68 years. Freshmen made up 47.4% o f the sample, while sophomores
comprised 27.8%, juniors 15.9%, seniors 7.6%, and other students (such as non
degree or graduate students) 1.3%. The overwhelming majority (94.7%) o f the
participants were Caucasian. Almost half o f the sample (49.7%) reported a
permanent home address in New Hampshire, while 26.8% reported Massachusetts,
13.9% reported a permanent address in another New England State, 7.9% reported
being from a State outside New England, and 1.7% reported a home address outside
o f the United States. Please refer to Table 1 for a breakdown o f participants’ home
addresses by region.
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Table 1
Participants’ permanent address locations
Frequency
Area/State
Percent
Southern NH 112
37.10
MA
81
26.80
26
8.60
Central NH
24
7.90
Outside NE
6.30
19
CT
Northern NH 12
4.00
3.00
RI
9
2.60
ME
8
VT
2.00
6
Outside US
1.70
5

Although about h alf o f the sample (53.6%) reported that they knew that the
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant existed prior to participation in the study, most
participants reported that they knew little (34.1%) or very little (44.0%) about nuclear
power prior to participating. O f the remaining group, 18.9% reported that they knew
a fair amount about nuclear power, 2.3% reported that they knew a lot, and .7%
reported that they knew enough to be considered an expert. Prior to participating in
the study, 44.0% o f participants reported that they were not concerned at all about the
safety o f nuclear power plants, while 34.8% reported a little concern, 16.2% reported
a moderate amount o f concern, 4.6% reported that they were very concerned, and .3%
reported that they were very concerned.
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Materials and Design
Manipulation articles
In order to manipulate anxiety, participants were randomly assigned to read
one of four passages that were described as “articles that are similar to what you
would read on an online news source.” The articles were all approximately the same
length (the mean was 808.25 words per article with a standard deviation o f 108.10
words). Anxiety was manipulated two ways: first, through the safety message
contained in the article (that nuclear power plants are generally safe, or that they are
generally unsafe), and second, through the personal threat o f danger (that there is a
nearby plant that has been threatened, or no mention o f the nearby plant).
The study contained four conditions. In the low anxiety condition, participants
read an article stressing the safety o f US nuclear power plants, without specific
reference to the nearby Seabrook plant. This condition can be described as the “safe
message, no personal threat” condition. Two medium anxiety conditions were
included: in the first, participants read an article stressing nuclear power plant safety
specific to the nearby Seabrook plant. Because o f the personal relevance o f this
article, this condition can be described as the “safe message, personal threat”
condition. In the second medium-anxiety condition, participants read an article about
serious safety concerns at US power plants, but with no specific mention o f the
Seabrook plant (the “unsafe, no personal threat” condition). And finally, in the highanxiety condition, participants read about serious safety concerns at the nearby
Seabrook plant (the “unsafe, personal threat” condition).
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Measures
All o f the measures were administered to participants using a web-based
survey on Dell computers using the Windows operating system. The B rief Mood
Introspection Scale (Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) was used to measure current mood
state (including anxiety) before and immediately after the manipulation. After the
presentation o f the manipulation article, participants also completed a brief (8-item)
questionnaire designed to measure bound anxiety - their anxiety specifically related to
nuclear terrorism. They were then automatically directed to a webpage containing
links to further information about nuclear power plant safety (described below). A
software program, StatCounter, tracked the movements within the website for each o f
the participants, including the number o f links that the participant visited, the order in
which the links were visited, and the amount o f time that was spent on each o f the
links.
After the free-search period, participants completed the Need for Evaluation
Scale (Jarvis & Petty, 1996) and the Miller Behavioral Style Scale (Miller, 1987) in
order to assess individual differences in the preference for information exposure.
Additionally, participants completed the 10-item Brief Big Five measure (Gosling,
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003) and a measure o f trait anxiety (the BMIS scale, modified
to measure trait emotion). Although trait anxiety was included as a covariate in the
analyses, it was measured after experimental manipulation for two reasons: first,
exposure to several mood state and trait measures prior to the manipulation might
have enabled participants to identify emotion as a primary variable o f interest in the
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study, thus introducing the possibility o f bias; and second, participants’ levels o f
anxiety were somewhat elevated upon entering the psychology laboratory. The
completion o f the trait anxiety measure at the end o f the study may have provided
more accurate data about the typical emotion traits o f the participants. After
demographic data was collected, the participants completed a brief (5 item) recall test
for the information presented in the manipulation article.
Experimental Website
The website in which the participants could search contained eight links to
articles containing further information about nuclear terrorism. Four o f the articles
contained safety-threatening information, including how to survive a nuclear blast;
information about terrorists’ interests in nuclear technology; information about what
happens during a nuclear explosion; and first-person accounts o f the Chernobyl
nuclear disaster. The other four articles contained reassuring information about the
safety and benefits o f nuclear power, including the long history o f safety o f nuclear
power plants worldwide; information about the economic and environmental benefits
of nuclear power; an editorial criticizing groups who believe that US nuclear power
plants are vulnerable to terrorism; and detailed information about the safety
regulations at US plants. The content o f these articles was collected from a variety of
sources, including National Defense magazine (Stanton, 2002), the Nuclear Energy
Institute’s website (www.nei.org), books by experts in the field (i.e., Allison, 2004), a
BBC special report on the anniversary o f the Chernobyl disaster (BBC, 2006), the
website o f the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (www.nrc.gov), and the online
Nuclear Weapons Archive (www.nuclearweaponarchive.org). The content collected
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from these sources was then summarized and reported in the format o f an article that
would appear in an “in-depth” section o f a news website.
Additionally, 5 filler links were included under the headline “In other news.”
These links (about Mexican elections, childhood health issues, a real estate bubble,
the recall o f the drug Vioxx, and the looting o f the Iraqi National Museum) gave
participants the option o f not reading about nuclear terrorism, preventing meaningless
search behavior. These articles were obtained through Seacoastonline.com,
CNN.com, and Boston.com.
The main experimental website that contained the links to the above-described
articles was modeled on an “in-depth” section o f a news website, specifically, the
BBC special report on the anniversary o f the Chernobyl disaster (BBC, 2006). This
main page contained a banner at the top reading “NHNews.com”
and featured a picture o f a nuclear power plant in the upper left comer. Under text
that read “Is Nuclear Power Safe?” were eight images, each o f which were links to
the reassuring and threatening articles. Shortened versions o f the articles’ titles
appeared below their corresponding link images. For example, the link to the article
describing the events that occur during a nuclear explosion featured a picture o f a
fiery cloud and the caption “What happens in a nuclear explosion?” The links to the
filler articles did not contain pictures, and were listed vertically on the left side o f the
page. Please see Appendix D for a screenshot o f the main page.
Although the content o f the website was written and designed by the
experimenter, the website itself was constructed by Zachary Ambrose, a professional
website developer who works for an electronic publishing firm in New York City.
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Procedure
The data collection sessions lasted for approximately 55 minutes. Originally,
all the data were supposed to be collected in a “super-tech” classroom containing 30
computers. However, due to limited availability o f this room, data were also
collected in a smaller room containing 4 computers. Approximately half o f the data
were collected from groups o f 4 or fewer participants, and h alf from groups o f 10 or
larger.
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were given oral instructions. The
script for these instructions is as follows:
“The purpose o f this study is to identify factors that influence how
people use internet news sources. First, you will be asked to answer
some questions, mostly about your current mood state. Then you will
be reading a news article, something similar to what you might see on
an online news website. After the article, there will be some more
questions, and then you will have approximately half an hour to
explore a website that contains links to further information about the
article you read. Stay within that one website, and I will stop you with
further instructions after about a half hour. There will be some more
survey questions, and then you will be all set to go. Are there any
questions?”

If there were no questions, the participants were asked to sign their consent
forms. Additionally, they were asked to record their name, student identification
number, and instructor’s name on an index card that was selected from a stack o f pre
shuffled cards that contained the numbers 1-4, referring to the manipulations.
Participants were assigned to the condition number that was randomly drawn out o f
the deck o f shuffled cards, so that multiple conditions were run simultaneously. The
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students were then directed to the experiment’s website, given the site’s username
and password, and were told to enter the number on their index card.
The time at which the students entered their numbers into the website was
noted, and the participants were allotted 33 minutes to complete the BMIS, read the
manipulation article, complete the BMIS and bound anxiety measure, and engage in
the free search on the experiment website. After 33 minutes had passed, the
participants were asked to continue with the experiment by moving on to the
questionnaires. They completed, in order, the BMIS, the bound-anxiety measure, the
MBSS, the Need for Evaluation Scale, the Brief Big Five measure, the trait BMIS, a
demographics survey, the BMIS and bound anxiety measure again, and then the recall
test.
Participants in the unsafe message conditions were thoroughly debriefed
through an oral presentation about the differences between nuclear power plants and
nuclear bombs, and the safety precautions that would prevent a nuclear plant from
exploding like a bomb (see appendix A for debriefing materials). The other
participants were debriefed with a written statement about the purpose o f the study
and the minimal risks that nuclear power plants pose to local populations. All o f the
participants were encouraged to take a debriefing form specific to their condition
upon leaving the laboratory.
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CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

State Anxiety Measure
In order to measure state anxiety, participants completed the B rief Mood
Introspection Scale, a general mood measure. Again, these ratings were collected at four
points during the experimental session: immediately before the anxiety manipulation,
immediately following the anxiety manipulation, immediately following the free-search
period, and upon completion o f the other scales used as part o f this experiment.
In order to obtain a measure o f anxiety from the BMIS, a principal components
factor analysis with Varimax rotation was conducted on the data obtained from the first
administration o f the BMIS. Four factors that were consistent with prior work on the
BMIS emerged with eigenvalues greater than 1: a pleasant-unpleasant factor, a positiverelaxed factor, a negative-tired factor, and an anxiety factor. Together, these four factors
explained 58.29% o f the variance after rotation. Because the fourth factor, anxiety, is the
most relevant to the present study, the discussion will be limited to this factor.
The anxiety factor, which explained 12.39% o f the variance after rotation, was
correlated with the items nervous, jittery, and calm (reverse-scored). Each o f these three
item s had strong to m oderate load in gs on the factor (.7 2 , .78, and .56, resp ectiv ely ), N o

other item on the BMIS had a loading on this factor greater than .31.
Unit-weighted scale scores were computed for these items for each BMIS
administration. The Cronbach a internal reliabilities o f the anxiety scale for each o f the
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four administrations o f the BMIS were .63, .67, .57, and .44, in order from first
administration to last.
State Anxiety Manipulation Check
In order to determine if the experimental manipulation affected participants’
anxiety level, two analyses of variance were conducted. First, a two-way (safety message
x personal threat) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the 4 anxiety scores
obtained from each participant. Please refer to Table 2 for the mean state anxiety ratings
by condition.
Table 2
Means and standard deviations o f state anxiety scores
Condition
Baseline
Post-manipulation
Safe Message
No Threat
5.84(1.80)
5.63 (1.98)

Post-search

Post-Survey

5.90(1.77)

3.53(1.31)

Safe Message
Personal Threat

5.43 (1.72)

5.64(1.79)

5.91 (1.63)

3.51 (1.15)

Unsafe Message
No threat

5.41 (1.75)

6.55 (1.99)

6.38 (1.78)

3.87(1.30)

Unsafe Message
Personal threat

5.07(1.94)

6.45(2.11)

6.28 (2.08)

3.69(1.43)

A main effect was found for anxiety across time, W ilk’s A=.21, F(3,296)=362.10,
p<.001, partial r)2=.79. A polynomial analysis o f these scores showed a significant
quadratic trend, F(l,298)=461.57, p<.001, partial t |2= 6 1 . An anxiety measurement
occasion x message interaction was also found, W ilk’s A=.92, F(3, 296)=8.79, p<.001,
partial r|2 = .08. Participants who read an unsafe message showed a significant increase
in anxiety immediately after the manipulation t(145)=7.93, p<.001, d —.66. Their anxiety
levels did not change during the search period. After completion o f the surveys,
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however, reported anxiety levels dropped significantly from the post-manipulation
reading t(145)=3.62, pc.001, d=.30. Participants who read a safe message, on the other
hand, did not show a significant increase in anxiety after the manipulation or after the
search period; the only significant differences found within these participants’ anxiety
ratings were between the final BMIS administration (the lowest score) and the baseline
score and each o f the other administrations, t(155)=3.28, p=. 001, d=. 26, t(155)=17.15,
pc.001, d = \A l, and t(155)=19.79, p<.001, <7=1.60 for the comparison between the final
BMIS scores and the baseline, post-manipulation, and post-search period BMIS scores
respectively. The type o f message, then, had significant effects on anxiety levels, while
the level o f threat (personal or not personal) did not affect anxiety scores. Please see
Figure 1.
Figure 1
Changes in state anxiety ratings across time
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In order to control for any effect o f trait anxiety, a between-subjects ANCOVA
was conducted on the participants’ anxiety scores immediately following the
manipulation. Trait anxiety was measured with an adaptation o f the BMIS to measure
mood traits, and contained the same three items that comprised the state anxiety
measures: nervous, jittery, and calm (a=.46). Trait anxiety was found to be a significant
covariate, F(l,297)=40.59, p<.001, partial r|2=. 12. Controlling for trait anxiety, the effect
o f the safety message was still significant, F(l,297)=17.75, p<.001, partial r|2=.06. N o
other main effects or interactions were found.
Finally, in order to control for the effects o f the believability o f the manipulation
article and previous knowledge o f the existence o f the Seabrook plant, these variables
were also added into an ANCOVA model as covariates. Neither o f these variables
produced a significant effect on anxiety levels following the manipulation.
To summarize, anxiety levels did change significantly over time. However, only
one factor had an effect: participants who read articles about safety concerns at nuclear
power plants experienced a significant increase in anxiety, and their anxiety levels
remained elevated until the completion o f the search period. The factor that represented
personal relevance o f the threat did not have an effect. In fact, even when the repeated
measures ANCOVA was run controlling for previous knowledge o f the existence o f the
Seabrook plant, the effect o f the safety message was still statistically significant, W ilk’s
A=.92, F(l,299)=26.04, pc.001, partial r|2=.08.

Bound Anxiety Measure
In addition to general state anxiety, anxiety specific to terrorism was also
measured. Bound anxiety was measured three times, each time immediately following the
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administration o f the BMIS: after the experimental manipulation, after the search period,
and at the completion o f the questionnaires. Because the items on the bound anxiety
questionnaire might have indicated the true nature o f the experiment, this questionnaire
was not administered with the BMIS prior to the experimental manipulation. Thus, no
baseline measure o f anxiety related to terrorism was obtained.
The brief bound-anxiety measure, created by the experimenter, included four
items designed to assess current feelings about anxiety specific to terrorism. Participants
responded to the items by choosing the number on a four-point scale that best represented
the degree to which they felt the following: “anxious about terrorism and other
catastrophic events”, “afraid o f events that I cannot control”, “scared that my family,
friends, and I are not really safe”, and “worried that it is only a matter o f time before
another terrorist attack occurs.” In addition to these four terrorism-related items, four
filler items were also included in the measure: “satisfied with the precautions the
government is taking to keep our homeland safe,” “upset about the damage to our
environment”, “pleased with nuclear power as a clean, sustainable, and safe energy
source”, and “relieved about the progress that has been made in fighting Al-Qaeda.”
These items were included to disguise the true nature o f the bound anxiety measure.
A principal components factor analysis with Varimax rotation was run on the data
yielded by the first administration o f the bound anxiety measure. As expected, two
factors emerged: one that was correlated with each o f the four items designed to measure
anxiety specific to terrorism (factor loadings were .81, .80, .81, and .77 respectively, for
each o f the items as they are listed above) and one that was correlated with the filler
items related to satisfaction with the progress that has been made in the fight against
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terror (these items were “relieved about the progress that has been made in fighting AlQaeda”, which had a factor loading o f .79; “Pleased with nuclear power as a clean,
sustainable, and safe energy source, which had a factor loading o f .72; and “satisfied with
the precautions the government is taking to keep our homeland safe, which had a factor
loading o f .64). The first factor explained 37.65% o f the variance after rotation, and the
second factor explained 18.80%.
Just as for the BMIS, unit-weighted scale scores were computed from the items
that were correlated with the factor measuring anxiety specific to terrorism. Cronbach a
reliabilities were computed for each o f the three administrations o f the bound anxiety
scale. For the first administration o f the scale, a = .82, the second administration yielded
a = .86, and for the final administration, a = .90.
Bound Anxiety Manipulation Check
Just as with the general anxiety measure, a repeated measures analysis o f variance
was conducted on the scores from the bound anxiety ratings as well. Please refer to
Table 3 for the means.
Table 3
Means and standard deviations o f bound anxiety scores
Condition
Post-manipulation
Post-Search
Safe Message
No Threat
9.53 (2.67)
10.44 (3.07)

Post-Survey
8.72 (3.27)

Safe Message
Personal Threat

9.53 (2.85)

10.22 (3.30)

9.18(3.54)

Unsafe Message
No Threat

11.71 (2.56)

11.93 (2.37)

10.63 (3.08)

Unsafe Message
Personal Threat

11.63 (2.64)

11.49(2.84)

10.44 (2.26)
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A pattern similar to that o f the BMIS results was found: there was a significant
main effect for time, W ilk’s A=.78, F=44.35, p<.001, partial r|2=.23. The trend was
quadratic, F (l, 298)=80.02, p<.001, partial ri2=.21. Participants who read an unsafe
message about nuclear power had significantly higher bound anxiety ratings than
participants who read a safe message, W ilk’s A=.95, F(2,297)=7.26, p=.001, partial
r| =.05. Between subjects contrasts found a significant difference between the safe
message and unsafe message groups at each measurement interval: t(300)=6.93, p<.001,
<7=.80, t(300)=4.08, p<.001, <7=.47, and t(300)=4.19, p<.001, <7=47 for the first, second,
and third measurements, respectively. For the group that read the unsafe message, bound
anxiety levels did not change between the experimental manipulation and the search
period, but showed a significant decrease between the post-manipulation and post-survey
completion measures t(145)=5.52, p<.001, d= .46. For the group that read a safe message
about nuclear power, bound anxiety levels were significantly higher than the post
manipulation reading after the search period, t(155)=5.71, p<.001, <7=61, but a
significant decrease was observed between the post-search and post-survey completion
readings, t ( l 55) = 7.67, p<.001, <7=.23. Please refer to Figure 2.
To control for the effect o f trait anxiety, a between-subjects ANCOVA was run on
the bound anxiety scale that was administered after the manipulation. Trait anxiety was
found to be a significant covariate, F(l,297)=11.21, p<.001, partial r|2=.04. Controlling
for trait anxiety, there was still a main effect for safety message, F(l,297)=53.25, p<.001,
partial t| =.15. After the anxiety manipulation, then, participants who read the unsafe
message had significantly higher bound anxiety scores than participants who read a safe
message. No other main effects or interactions were found.
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Figure 2
C hanges in boun d a n xiety ratings across tim e
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Bound Anxiety Scale Phase

Search Behavior
After reading the manipulation article, participants were allotted 33 minutes in
which to freely search a website that contained links to three different types o f articles: 4
articles that stressed the threat posed by nuclear power, 4 articles that highlighted the
safety record and benefits o f nuclear power, and 5 filler articles unrelated to nuclear
power. The major dependent variables o f interest were the number o f visits to each o f the
types o f articles, the amount o f time spent reading each o f the types o f articles, and the
order in which the types o f articles were visited.
Preliminary analyses revealed large differences in preference for article type
collapsed across conditions. The participants had a strong preference for articles
containing threatening information, measured both by number o f visits to these articles,
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F(2,903) = 56.30, p<.001, partial r\2=.\ 1, and the amount o f time spent on them, F(2
,903)=596.14, p<.000, r)2=.57. Please see Table 4 and Figures 3 and 4.

Table 4
Mean times (in seconds) and number o f visits to websites containing threatening,
reassuring, and filler articles________________________________________________
Article Type

Mean Time (SD)

Mean Visits (SD)

Threatening

922.31 (373.32)

3.07(1.29)

Reassuring

333.08 (275.84)

2.36 (1.63)

Filler

128.83 (206.26)

1.67(1.87)

______

Figure 3
Mean time (in seconds) spent on websites containing threatening, reassuring, and filler
articles

Threatening

Reassuring

Filler

Article Type
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Figure 4
M ean num ber o f v isits to w eb sites containing threatening, reassuring, and filler
inform ation
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In order to assess differences in preference for information exposure between the
experimental groups, a series o f 2 x 2 (safety message x personal threat) between subjects
ANCOVAs was conducted, with time spent on each type o f website and number o f clicks
on each type o f websites as the dependent variables. Trait anxiety was again included as a
covariate. No main effects or interactions were found; the experimental groups did not
differ in their search behavior. Please see Figure 5.
Additionally, participants were divided into high, medium, and low anxiety groups.
The same 2 x 2 ANCOVA was conducted on the time spent on each o f the websites for
these groups. No significant main effects or interactions were found.
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Figure 5
Distribution o f time (in seconds) spent on threatening, reassuring, and filler websites by
condition
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To test the effects o f behavioral style, participants were initially grouped according
to the scale within the Miller Behavioral Style Survey on which they scored the highest monitoring or blunting. This method resulted in grossly unequal groups,

N m o n itors

= 200,

Nbiunters= 36, N unciassifiabie= 5 8 . Rather than group participants according to this method,

then, the scores on the monitoring scale (the more reliable scale, a = .64) o f the Miller
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Behavioral Style Survey was entered into the ANCOVA models as a covariate. This scale
was not found to be a significant covariate. Even with controlling for behavioral style no
significant differences were found: participants in each group searched similarly to each
other regardless o f previously-existing preferences for information exposure.
In order to assess the effects o f need for evaluation, a median split was used to
divide the participants into high- and low need for evaluation groups. A score o f 50.00 or
greater was considered to be high, while 49.99 or lower was considered low. This
division yielded approximately equal groups, Nhigh-157, Ni0W=T44). When entered into
the ANCOVA model, however, this variable did not produce significant results. The
groups did not differ from each other or interact with other variables to produce
significant effects.
Participants strongly preferred threatening information, then, in all o f the
experimental conditions. In order to supplement the results o f the non-significant
ANCOVAs reported above, an exploratory standard multiple regression was conducted
with time spent on threatening websites as the dependent variable. The following
predictor variables were included in the model: state anxiety (SA) scores (the mean of
the BMIS anxiety scale score and bound anxiety scale score, both administered
immediately after the manipulation), trait anxiety (TA) scores, scores on the Need for
Evaluation Scale (nEval), scores on the Monitoring Scale (MS) o f the Miller Behavioral
Style Survey, gender (coded 1 = male, 2 = female), believability o f the manipulation
(Bel, coded l=not at all believable, 5 =extremely believable) and message type (Mess,
coded 0 = safe, 1 = unsafe).
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The regression was statistically significant, R=.29, R2=.08, adjusted R2=.06., F(7,
275)=3.46, p=.001. The amount o f time spent on threatening websites could be predicted
with these independent variables. However, the amount o f explained variance was small:
roughly 6%. The results o f this standard regression are summarized in Table 5.
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Table 5
Correlations between Time on Threatening Webpages (Time), State Anxiety (SA), Trait Anxiety (TA), Need for Evaluation
(nEval), Behavioral Style (MS), Manipulation Believability (Bel), Gender (Sex), and Message (Mess)___________________
SA
TA
MS
nEval
Bel
Sex
Mess
Mean
SD
on

nEval Bel
Time SA
TA
MS
.06
-.09
.25**
17**
17**
-.13*
20***
-.16** .03
.08
.16** -.13*
-.07
-.03
.00
22*** .10
.02
.00
-.15** .00
3
g
*
*
*
.17
.04
.04
-.09 -.03
928.03
371.60

8.36
2.00

6.49
1.50

6.37 49.84
1.58 6.11

3.21
.93

B
26.75***
-22.23
-25.30
-9.11*
52.35*
-31.89
.05
-92.45*
Intercept =1397.29***
Sex Mess

a

a

a

a

P
.14
-.09
-.11

.13
.13
-.04
-.13

sr2
.01
>.01
.01
.01
.02
>.01
.01

R2= .08
R2adj = .06
R = .29*
*p<.05. **p<.01, ***p<.001
aBecause gender and message were dummy variables, mean and standard deviations were not reported

The t ratios were examined to assess the relative contributions o f each o f the independent
- variables. O f the seven predictors, three were significant: state anxiety t(275)=2.04, p=.04, need
for evaluation t(285)=-2.48, p=.01, and believability t(275)=2.24, p=.03. For both anxiety and
believability, higher ratings predicted more time spent on the threatening websites, while higher
scores on the Need for Evaluation Scale predicted less time on threatening websites. The
proportions o f variance uniquely explained by each o f these predictors were very small: sr =.01
for state anxiety, sr2=.01 for Need for Evaluation, and sr2=.02 for believability.
When this set o f independent variables was used to predict time spent on reassuring and
filler websites, the model was not significant.
Order o f Website Visits
In order to assess the order in which the types o f websites were visited, a series o f chi
square analyses was conducted on the content o f the first, second, and third websites visited (not
including the main page) by each participant. Although most participants returned to the main
page before selecting another website to visit, some participants used the back button on their
browser. This action caused their search behavior to appear out of sync with the majority o f
participants, whose search pattern can be described as follows: visit to website X, return to main
page, visit to website Y, return to main page, etc. Cases that did not follow this pattern were
eliminated from the chi square analyses.
For their first viewed article, participants were more likely to choose reassuring content,
%2 (n=301, df=2)= 64.07, p<.001. Forty nine and a half percent o f participants selected a
reassuring article first, while 36.9% chose a threatening article and 12.6% chose a filler article.
The pattern changed for the second and third visits, however: threatening information was more

62

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

likely to be selected, %2 (n=265, df=2)= 111.31, p<.001 and %2 (n=233, df=2)=29.23, p<.001 for
the second and third visits, respectively For the second article selected, 63.40% chose a
threatening article, 23.02% chose a reassuring article, and 13.58% chose a filler article. For the
third article visited, 45.49% chose threatening information, 35.62% chose reassuring
information, and 18.88% chose filler information. It should be noted that the arrangement o f the
articles on the main page might have had an effect on the order o f articles selected: all 149 o f the
participants who selected a reassuring article first selected the same article about the benefits of
nuclear power. The link to this article appeared in the upper, left-most comer o f the links table, a
position that may have created a positive bias for this article immediately upon entering the main
site (technical difficulties prevented the website developer from randomizing the position o f the
article links for each participant). Follow-up analyses revealed no significant differences in the
order o f content visited by experimental condition. Please see Figure 6.
Figure 6
Order in which participants viewed articles, by content

■ Threatening
■ Reassuring
□ Filler

First visit

Second visit

Third visit

V isit to articles after manipulation
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Recall
Finally, in order to assess differences in information retention across the experimental
groups, a 2 x 2 (message x threat) between subjects ANOVA was run using scores on the recall
test as the dependent variable. Recall score reflects the number o f correct items on a 5-item
surprise quiz administered at the end o f the experimental session, A main effect was found for
message, F(3,298)=12.20 p^.OOl, partial r|2=.04. Participants who read the unsafe message
(M=2.75, SD=.97) had more accurate recall o f the information presented in the manipulation
article than participants who read the safe message (M=2.31, SD=1.22).
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CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The major purpose o f this study was to determine whether anxiety increases or
decreases preference for exposure to information about a threat. Prior to this study, most
work on this topic was conducted within one o f two theoretical frameworks: the affective
intelligence framework, which posits that anxiety will increase preference for
information, and the terror management framework, which posits that preference for
threat information is low under most circumstances. To correct for limitations in the
political science and psychology literatures, the design o f this study departed from
existing studies in several ways: first, anxiety was operationally defined using emotion
and arousal measures that are well-established in the psychology literature. Second,
anxiety was manipulated in addition to being measured. Third, because the goal o f this
study is to generalize to search behavior under real threats o f terrorism, the manipulation
was designed to maximize ecological validity by appearing as similar as possible to a
threat that might be encountered in the real world. Fourth, a behavioral measure o f
preference for information was included. Fifth, individual difference variables that might
affect information preference were measured and controlled.
Under these experimental conditions, participants demonstrated a very strong
preference for threatening information. Regardless o f both the type o f message they read
about nuclear safety and level o f personal threat, participants preferred to read
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information that elaborated on the nature o f the terrorist threat to nuclear power plants,
and the sequence o f events that would occur if a plant was successfully attacked. On the
surface, then, it appears that the theory o f affective intelligence is the more accurate
model o f information preference. Participants collected information that might be helpful
to them in the future, if such an explosion should occur. Compared with the time spent
on the threatening web pages, participants practically ignored information that would
assure them that risk o f terrorism to US plants is low, information that should be more
interesting to them if they were managing terror.
However, this finding is complicated by the fact that, while the groups did not
differ in their preference for threatening information, they did differ in their anxiety
levels. To understand the influence o f anxiety on information preference - if there is one
- other variables must be considered.
In the pages that follow, the relation between anxiety and selective information
exposure will be discussed, followed by a discussion o f the other variables that were
assessed in this study. The limitations o f the findings will then be discussed, followed by
the implications o f the study and future directions for this line o f research.

Anxiety
The present study attempted to manipulate anxiety on two levels: through safety
message (i.e., that nuclear power plants are safe, or that they are unsafe), and through
personal threat (i.e., the manipulation article focused on the nearby Seabrook plant, or
focused on US nuclear power plants in general). While unsafe messages were associated
with increases in state anxiety, no effect for threat was found: terrorist threat to the nation
in general aroused as much anxiety as a threat specific to the participants’ home region.
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The failure o f the manipulation to produce significantly more anxiety among the
participants who read an unsafe message about the nearby plant could be explained two
different ways: first, it may be the case that the possibility o f terrorists targeting
Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant is not believable or realistic, especially, perhaps, among
people who live nearby. However, no differences were found between the groups on
ratings o f the manipulation articles’ believability or realism. Second, participants might
have been aware o f the existence o f the Seabrook plant before participating in the study,
and therefore interpreted the national threat as a personal threat. This explanation was
also ruled out. When previous knowledge o f the existence o f the Seabrook plant was
controlled, the pattern o f results did not change.
Although scarce, a few studies have examined the relation between personal and
collective threat. Arian and Gordon (1993), studied residents o f Tel Aviv during the Gulf
War and found that personal interpretations o f a threat increased anxiety. Roughly 30%
of respondents very strongly agreed with the statement that Saddam Hussein was “out to
get them” personally, a belief that was associated with higher ratings o f fear than the
beliefs that Saddam Hussein was out to get them as “a Jew,” as “an Israeli”, or “as the
Jewish People.”
In a separate study, Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, and Provost (2002) found evidence
that terrorist threat is comprised o f two distinct (but related) dimensions: personal threat
and national threat. Personal threat had a small effect on behavior designed to minimize
risk o f terrorism (such as not flying), but did not influence estimates about the economic
consequences o f terrorism. Perceived national threat, on the other hand, did influence
predictions about the economic impact that another attack would have.
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These findings highlight the importance o f threat perception as a variable in
political psychological research. They demonstrate that the perception o f threat can
underlie economic beliefs, which in turn can influence attitudes toward relevant policies
- an important outcome. Moreover, they demonstrate that social psychological factors,
such as identity salience, can influence the perception o f a threat. While the present
study did not include measures that would shed light on the way the participants
interpreted the threatening information posed in the manipulation articles, its failure to
find a difference in anxiety levels between personal and national threats are compelling in
light o f the limited research on the topic. More work is needed to understand the
processes underlying the appraisal o f a threat as personal or collective, and the emotional
and attitudinal consequences o f each type o f appraisal.
Further understanding o f the processes underlying threat interpretation might also
shed light on the effect o f anxiety on information preference. The present study found
only weak evidence for an effect o f anxiety on selective exposure. The results o f the
main hypothesis test revealed no differences between the experimental groups on the
amount o f time spent on threatening, reassuring, or filler-content websites. An
exploratory regression found that state anxiety levels did affect the amount o f time spent
on the threatening content, but only when a host o f other variables were controlled: trait
anxiety, behavioral style, need for evaluation, believability, gender, and safety message.
When the effects o f these variables were removed, participants with higher levels o f state
anxiety spent more time reading threatening content, although the effect was small.
However, it should be noted that this finding is also consistent with the affective
intelligence approach.

68

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

What can account for the failure o f anxiety to strongly influence preference for
information in the current study? It could be the case that biases toward negative,
threatening, and/or emotional information that operate independently from anxiety were
in effect. Kyrios and lob (1998) found that trait-anxious individuals paid more attention
to threatening stimuli, but not significantly more than non-anxious individuals. In fact,
both anxious and non-anxious individuals spent more time focusing on threatening
stimuli than on neutral stimuli, suggesting a general bias towards threatening information.
Media outlets seem to already know this, and frequently feature more negative news
stories than positive ones (Berkowitz, 1991; Shoemaker, Chang, & Brendlinger, 1987).
Evidence to support a bias toward emotional stimuli relative to neutral stimuli
also abounds. In separate studies, both Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers, & Rotteveel (2006)
and Phelps and Anderson (2001) found that subjects were quicker at processing emotionrelated stimuli than neutral stimuli. Additionally, Ferre (2003) found enhanced recall for
both positive and negative emotion words compared with neutral words. In studies o f
news consumption, Grabe, Lang, and Zhao (2003) found that “tabloidized” news stories
(stories that were reported in a sensational style, designed to heighten emotional reaction)
attracted more attention than traditionally reported stories. And Bolls, Lang, and Potter
(2001) reported that degree o f emotional arousal, rather than emotional valence, was a
better predictor o f attention to radio advertisements.
The preference for the threatening articles in the current study, then, could be a
manifestation o f these biases. Participants had a choice between content that aroused
negative emotion and neutral content, and chose the arousing content for most o f the
allotted time. The results o f the current study are particularly interesting in light o f
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previous findings because they replicate the same effects under experimental conditions
very different from existing studies. Previous research on attentional biases and anxiety
have used reaction-time procedures, such as the Stroop task and dot probe techniques that
allow for the clear detection o f simple approach-avoidance behavior for anxiety-related
stimuli. While these methodologies are important because they illuminate the basic
cognitive processes that operate in anxiety, they may fail to capture the complexity o f the
consequences o f anxiety-provoking stimuli in the real world. The replication o f these
effects within more complex stimuli, then, suggests that these biases may operate in
higher-order cognitive tasks as well.
One such process that these biases might affect is information selection. Even in
studies that do use more ecologically valid threat stimuli, such as news articles or
broadcasts, participants are rarely offered a choice in what they will be watching or
reading. Instead, attention and interest are measured through a mixture o f self-report and
physiological techniques. Thus, the methodology o f the current study departs from the
existing literature in a second way, through offering participants a choice o f information
to view. The strong preference for threatening information may indicate that attentional
biases toward negative or emotional information are operating in decisions about which
information to read. Again, more research is needed to elucidate the effect o f anxiety on
higher-order cognitive tasks.

Behavioral Style
It appears that more research is also needed to identify individual characteristics
that may mediate anxiety’s effects on selecting information. The Miller Behavioral Style
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Survey was included in the present study because o f its ability to predict information
seeking and avoidance in other (mostly medical) situations. In the present study,
however, scores on the short version o f the monitoring and blunting scales o f the MBSS
did not predict time spent on the threatening, reassuring, or filler websites.
In the short version o f the MBSS (Steptoe, 1989), participants read two scenarios,
one involving an anxiety-provoking trip to the dentist, and one involving the possibility
o f losing employment due to declining business. After reading each scenario,
participants read a series o f statements describing behavior, and marked which behaviors
they would be most likely to engage in. Some o f the behaviors are characteristic o f
people who prefer lots o f information (monitors), while the others are characteristic o f
those who prefer to avoid information (blunters). The marks for each type o f behavior
are added, providing the monitor and blunter scale scores. Examples o f behaviors on the
monitoring scale include “I would ask the dentist exactly what is going to be done” and “I
would talk to other employees to see what my supervisor’s evaluation o f me said.”
Examples o f blunting behaviors include “I would take a tranquilizer or have a drink
before going [to the dentist]” and “I would push all thoughts o f being laid off out o f my
mind.”
For the majority o f participants, scores on the monitoring scale were higher, a
finding consistent with other studies that have used the MBSS. Because the monitoring
scale had a higher Cronbach a reliability than the blunting scale, and also because
previous research has shown the monitoring scale to have greater predictive power, only
that scale was used as a covariate in the analyses o f variance on the time spent on each
type o f website and as an independent variable in the exploratory regression predicting
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time spent on the threatening web sites. In both analyses, inclusion o f the monitoring
variable failed to yield significant results.
It appears, then, that the predictive power o f the MBSS does not translate easily
from medical situations to socio-political applications. One feature that distinguishes the
two settings is the immediacy o f the threat: the MBSS was normed on patients about to
undergo a painful medical procedure - a threat that is very real, immediate, and definite.
In order to detect avoidance o f threatening information, anxiety might have to reach or
exceed a critical level that, for most people, can only occur under these extreme
circumstances. It is important to note here that terror management theorists use very
strong anxiety manipulations in order to find avoidance o f threatening information. The
failure o f the MBSS to predict exposure to threatening information might indicate that
anxiety levels were not high enough to necessitate distraction from the threat in the
present study. In other words, caution should be used when generating the results o f the
present study to different levels o f anxiety - it may be the case that an avoidance effect
consistent with the terror management literature would be found when anxiety levels
exceed those obtained in the present study.
Another feature that distinguishes medical threats from socio-political threats is
the nature o f the news. Social norms dictate that information about medical conditions is
relatively private, shared only with individuals who are close to the affected person.
News about socio-political events, on the other hand, can be used to facilitate social
interaction. Following Hurricane Katrina, Procopio and Procopio (2007) found that
displaced New Orleans residents used the internet to seek out social contact with
members o f their geographical community and to share information that lead to
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uncertainty reduction. In a time o f widespread crisis, knowing a great deal o f information
about the threat might be socially (and even evolutionarily) beneficial, leading to an
implicit attentional bias towards threatening information.
Because o f the proliferation o f news media over the past few decades, interest in
political attitude formation has increased as well. Crucial to understanding this process
will bet the identification o f variables that underlie preference for information exposure.
Although behavioral style was not a successful predictor of information exposure in this
study, more work is needed to adapt this useful construct to socio-political contexts.

Recall
Reading an unsafe message about nuclear power plants was associated with more
accurate recall o f the material presented in the manipulation article. Better recall for
these conditions is consistent with the finding that participants preferred threatening
information: the emotional nature o f these articles may have increased the readers’
attention and motivation for comprehension.
This finding is also consistent with the literature on emotion and memory bias.
Several studies have shown that non-anxious participants tend to recall negative or
threatening information more accurately than neutral information (Reidy & Richards,
1997; Norton, Schaefer, Cox, Dorward, & Wozney, 1988; Kent, 1985).
It is interesting to note that the participants who read the threatening information
also had elevated levels o f anxiety. According to the vast body o f literature on anxiety
and memory, small to moderate increases in state anxiety are associated with superior
memory recall, while levels o f high state anxiety are associated with decreased memory
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performance (Eysenck, 1992). Thus, the results o f the recall test provide further evidence
that the level o f anxiety attained by the experimental manipulation was rather moderate
and probably insufficient to induce the cognitive deficits documented by the terror
management theorists. The goal o f the present study, however, was to use an ecologically
valid manipulation.

Need for Evaluation
Another individual difference variable to consider in preference for media
exposure is need for evaluation. Jarvis and Petty (1996) developed the Need for
Evaluation scale to measure individual preferences in assessing positive and negative
qualities o f an object. It contains items such as “I form opinions about everything”, “I
want to know exactly what is good and bad about everything”, and “I would rather have a
strong opinion than no opinion at all.” In the present study, participants with high scores
on the need for evaluation scale spent significantly less time relative to low need for
evaluation participants on the threatening websites when other variables (state and trait
anxiety, monitoring scale score, believability, gender, and message) were controlled. A
significant relation between need for evaluation scores and time spent on reassuring and
filler websites was found only when the latter two variables were added together,
suggesting that participants with high need for evaluation divided their remaining time
between reassuring and filler websites equally. Participants scoring high on this scale,
then, demonstrated a slight bias away from threatening information compared with
participants with low need for evaluation, but did not seek reassuring information.
It should be noted that the high need for evaluation participants still favored the
threatening information overall. The comparatively smaller amount o f time spent on the
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threatening web pages relative to low need for evaluation participants could be explained
a number o f different ways. First, high need for evaluation participants might have
decreased their time on the threatening articles because it was unpleasant for them to
evaluate the content. Their preference for the threatening content lessened after a certain
degree o f exposure, perhaps due to increased processing relative to participants with low
need for evaluation. This explanation seems somewhat counter-intuitive, however: one
would expect people with high need for evaluation to want exposure to multiple sides of
an issue before forming a strong opinion.
Then again, maybe not. In their original paper on the construction o f the Need for
Evaluation Scale, Jarvis and Petty (1996) cite the emerging literature on the automaticity
o f attitudes as justification for a need for evaluation construct. The finding that people
with high need for evaluation spent less time on threat-relevant articles is consistent with
the vast body o f literature suggesting that opinions and attitudes are largely the result of
heuristic-based processing (i.e., Khaneman & Tversky, 1982, Converse, 1964). Need for
evaluation was found to correlate only .35 with need for cognition, a moderate correlation
which lead Jarvis and Petty to declare that “evaluation by no means requires effortful
thought” (Jarvis & Petty, 1996, p. 182). Another possible explanation o f the present
findings, then, could be that high need for evaluation participants appraised the threat
information more quickly than low need for evaluation participants and then simply
moved on to other available information.
This interpretation seems more plausible than an avoidance effect, given the
extensive literature on heuristic processing and attitude formation. The present results
are thus consistent with other studies that have found that careful o f evaluation o f
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balanced information does not necessarily follow from having expressed a high need to
form opinions.

Limitations
Although one o f the major goals o f the present study was to observe selective
information exposure under real-world conditions, ecological validity was necessarily
compromised in a number o f ways.
First, the sample was not representative. Instead, a convenience sample o f college
students was used. A college student sample allowed for easier experimental
manipulation: a representative group o f local citizens would likely know more about
nuclear power and the Seabrook plant, rendering the manipulation articles less believable,
and a nationally representative sample would have demanded an experimental
manipulation that would be both personally relevant and anxiety-provoking to people
across a very large geographic area. Given the literature on the positive bias towards
negative stimuli, however, there is little reason to think that adults’ preference for
threatening information would differ from the students’. However, more research is
needed to determine that this is, in fact, the case.
Another limitation o f the present study was the restricted nature o f the search
behavior. Although participants had the freedom to choose which articles they would
read and in what order they would read them, they were limited to the threatening,
reassuring, and filler articles within the experimental website. There is a possibility that
the information that participants wanted most after reading the manipulation article was
not included in the website’s content. In future studies, including a search function for
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nuclear power information or asking participants what questions they have after reading
articles about nuclear power could help to ensure that the topics that participants are
particularly interested in are included.
Limiting participants to a single website also detracts from the ecological validity
o f the experiment. In the real world, individuals are likely to check other news sources in
order to obtain as much information as possible about a threat. Limiting search behavior
to one particular website thus limits the understanding o f selective information exposure
under threat. Moreover, the 33-minute time period allotted to participants is also an
artificial constraint. Although participants had the opportunity to read filler articles
unrelated to nuclear terrorism or to simply rest quietly when they were finished reading,
these precautions may not have sufficiently prevented meaningless search behavior that
could have inflated the observed interest in threatening information.
News source may also affect selective information exposure. Seeing a report o f
an imminent terrorist threat on a well known, national news site such as CNN.com may
influence preference for threat-related material differently than a report on a more local,
previously unknown site, such as the one used in this experiment.
Another limitation may be the placement o f the links to the articles on the main
page. Due to a technical difficulty, the links to the threatening and reassuring articles
remained constant for each participant. This arrangement was likely responsible for the
preference for the “benefits o f nuclear power” as the first article visited by about half of
the participants, and may have contributed to preference for certain articles in other ways
as well (during preliminary data collection, the main page randomized the location o f the
article links on each click back to the main page, but did not remain in the same position
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for each participant. Participants seemed confused by this and reported that they found
the website unconvincing).

Implications
Despite these limitations, however, this experiment still sheds light on preference
for threatening information exposure in important ways. The major finding o f this study
can be summarized as follows: biases towards negative stimuli operating independently
o f state anxiety enhance both attention to and recall for threatening information.
Moreover, limited evidence from other studies suggests that negative socio-political
events can serve as a social facilitator, which also may increase motivation for obtaining
and comprehending negative news. The preference for negative information appears to be
so strong that other information relative to the threat, such as background information
about the issue - tends to be ignored. There is greater interest in the consequences o f a
possible event than in circumstances that contribute to its likelihood o f occurring.
The implications o f these findings are broad. Within psychology, the present
study has replicated the finding that attentional biases toward negative information exist
using an experimental paradigm more complicated than the Stroop task and dot-probe
technique, answering a call by Izard (1991) to expand the methodology used to assess the
relation between emotion and information processing. Although these results do not shed
light on the cognitive structure o f state or trait anxiety, they do contribute to the existing
literature by demonstrating a preference for negative information in an ecologically valid
setting.
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From a political psychology perspective, this study indicates that the theory o f
affective intelligence may be the more useful theory o f selective information exposure in
the socio-political realm. None o f the findings o f the present study were consistent with
terror management theory, which posits that people aim to manage exposure to deathrelated information under ordinary, non-threatening circumstances. Although terror
management theory has been evoked to explain political-psychological phenomena, such
as political attitude formation, it seems that a very strong death-salience manipulation is
necessary to create an effect. So strong, in fact, that real-world applicability may be
precluded.
Furthermore, this study is relevant to the fields o f attitude formation and
prediction. The information that a person chooses to read about the possibility o f a future
catastrophic event may increase that person’s estimates o f the event actually happening,
which in turn may affect attitudes toward policies and the politicians who propose them.
Understanding the bias towards negative news will allow researchers to develop a more
accurate model o f political attitude formation.
Within political science, this study offers two pieces o f evidence against rational
choice theory: first, participants did not seek exposure to balanced information, and
second, high need for evaluation participants seemed to be satisfied with smaller amounts
o f exposure to information. These findings join the ever-expanding literature within
political science and political psychology on the surprisingly irrational nature o f political
behavior.
This study has implications in applied settings as well. News websites concerned
with providing the information their visitors want in a clear and efficient manner should
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consider putting threat-relevant information at the top o f the page or in another clearly
visible area. In broadcast news, which operates under a tight time constraints, producers
might consider reporting threat-related information first within the reportings o f
individual stories.
Governments and other organizations interested in dispensing safety information
will also find these data useful. Within the past few years, the United States has
witnessed several traumatic events made worse by blocked communication: the
destruction o f New Orleans by Hurricane Katrina and the massacre at Virginia Tech to
name just two. In order to communicate critical safety information, organizations will
likely find that including threat-relevant information within the context o f safety tips will
increase readership. For example, in addition to urging citizens to create emergency
contact plans, organizations such as the Red Cross might include descriptions o f how
communication systems can be disrupted. Embedding threat information within the
safety information is likely to arouse attention and heighten recall.
O f course, serious consequences arise when people are made unnecessarily
anxious, and so the applications o f the present study suggested above should be made
with extreme discretion. It would be unethical and, if anxiety reaches a certain level,
perhaps even ineffective to use scare tactics in order to achieve a certain goal. Studies in
health psychology, for example, have shown that arousing high levels o f anxiety is more
effective at promoting avoidance behavior than self-protective behavior (Janis &
Feshbach, 1953). The present study found that interest in threat information was high
when reported in the format o f objective news article. More research is needed to
determine the effects o f sensationalized threat information on interest.
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Directions for Future Research
Because anxiety did not produce dramatic effects on preference for information
exposure about a threatening socio-political event in this study, more research is needed
to understand its effects. A good starting point would be the establishment o f an external
validity criterion for anxiety arousal following exposure to threatening news reports.
Knowing, on average, how much anxiety levels increase following exposure to real
threats will allow researchers to know when their laboratory manipulations approximate
real-world conditions. It would also be useful to obtain lists o f questions or types o f
information desired by people experiencing a threatening report to prevent oversight o f
relevant pieces o f information in selective exposure studies.
Research is also needed to determine how preference for information changes
over time. People reading about an attack on a US embassy m ay immediately want to
know who is responsible and whether or not their own safety is jeopardized, but then may
desire information about the political motivations for the attack, perhaps followed by a
desire for information about what the likely repercussions o f the attack will be.
Determining if preference for information follows a stage or phase-like pattern and
understanding what distinguishes each stage or phase would greatly aid in the
understanding o f political attitude formation.
Moreover, work is needed to identify issue factors that affect preference for
information. For example, while attention is easily piqued by news related to terrorism, it
seems that more o f an effort is needed to arouse interest in anxiety-provoking
environmental issues, such as global warming. One factor that differentiates these issues
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is the immediacy o f the threat: while a terrorist threat could be imminent, dramatic
changes caused by global warming are not likely to occur for many years. Another factor
may be the controllability o f the event: while there is little that one can do to protect
himself or herself from a terrorist attack besides avoid certain places at the right time,
global warming coverage tends to focus on the problem’s capacity to be solved, perhaps
leading individuals to think that governments and scientists have a great deal o f control
over the issue. Yet another factor to consider is message frame: gain-framed information
(such as “protecting yourself against a terror attack” or “steps you can take to fight global
warming”) will likely affect information preferences differently from loss frames (“how
terror will affect the way you travel” or “global warming will cause widespread
epidemic”).
The personal relevance o f the threat is another area that needs further work. It
seems intuitive that framing a message in personal terms (“protecting yourself against a
terror attack”) versus framing a message in national/societal terms (“protecting the nation
against a terror attack”) would influence the type o f questions raised and information
desired by the reader. However, the results o f the present study indicate that these types
o f threats do not differ in the amount o f anxiety that they raise. Because previous
research has identified perceived national threats as relevant to policy attitudes (Huddy,
Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002) distinguishing the effects o f personal and national
threats is an area that should not be ignored.
Finally, more work is needed to determine if there are quantifiable individual
differences that affect preference for information exposure. The present study found
evidence suggesting that need for evaluation is associated with less time reading the
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articles, but the likelihood that other variables also affect preference for information is
great. Need for cognition, locus o f control, trait anxiety, levels o f media consumption,
and levels o f political knowledge are just some o f the variables that should be considered
in future studies on individual preferences for political information exposure. More
research is also needed to determine the capability o f the Miller Behavioral Style Scale to
be adapted into the area o f political psychology. Quantifying individual preferences for
information exposure has been integral to the field o f health psychology because o f its
contribution to the understanding o f patients’ coping abilities and behavior. The same
construct applied to political information would no doubt also be fruitful.

Conclusion
The present study may raise more questions than it answers. However, it offers a
partial answer to the questions about political attitudes and behavior under stress that
opened this dissertation - namely, that threat elicits a desire for more threat-related
information. Individuals and groups interested in predicting attitudes toward relevant
policies or candidates under such circumstances will benefit from knowing that people
are attracted to negative information that is likely to sustain their state o f heightened
arousal, and may lead them to over-estimate the probability o f the feared event.
Immediately following a threat or realized catastrophe, then, candidates who emphasize
future risk may receive more attention, and policies aimed at minimizing risk might
receive wider support.
The present study also offers some direction for future research. Specifically, it
highlights the need to understand the characteristics o f threatening information that
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makes it so compelling and the consequences o f focusing on the threatening aspects o f a
socio-political issue. Understanding how individuals select information about current
events will only increase in importance as information increases in availability, in
formats that range from traditional news reports to insider blogs to chat rooms and online
fora. The processes that underlie navigation through this information and dictate what
material is encoded and applied to attitude formation and change is crucial to
understanding and predicting the behavior o f citizens, an outcome as important to
governing institutions as it is interesting to academics, particularly under times o f duress.
“The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,” said Franklin D. Roosevelt. As fear and its
consequences in the political arena are elucidated, perhaps this statement will no longer
apply.

84

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

REFERENCES

Abelson, R.P., Kinder, D.R., Peters, M.D., & Fiske, S.T. (1982). Affective and semantic
components in political personal perception. Journal o f Personality and Social
Psychology, 42, 619-630.
Ader, R. & Cohen, N. (1985). CNS-immune system interactions: Conditioning
phenomena. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8, 379-394.
Allen, K.M., Blascovich, J., Tomaka, J., & Kelsey, R.M. (1991). Presence o f human
friends and pet dogs as moderators o f autonomic responses to stress in women.
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 61,582-589.
Allison, G. (2004). Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.
New York: Owl Books.
Anderson, A.K. & Phelps, E.A. (2001). Lesions o f the human amygdala impair enhanced
perception o f emotionally significant events. Nature, 411, 305-309.
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., & Cook, A. (2002). Mortality salience and the spreading
activation o f worldview-relevant constructs: Exploring the cognitive architecture
o f terror management. Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 131, 3 0 7 324.
Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997). Suppression,
accessibility, o f death-related thoughts, and cultural worldview defense:
Exploring the psychodynamics o f terror management. Journal o f Personality and
Social Psychology, 73, 5-18.
Arian, A. & Gordon, C. (1993). The political and psychological impact o f the G ulf War
on the Israeli Public. In S. Renshon (Ed.), The Political Psychology o f the G ulf
War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process o f Conflict (pp. 227-250). Pittsburgh:
University o f Pittsburgh Press.
Bar-Tal, Y. (1994). Monitoring, blunting, and the ability to achieve cognitive structure.
Anxiety, Stress, and Coping, 6, 265-274.

BBC (2006). Chernobyl: 20 Years On. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/in
depth/europe/2006/chemobyl/default.stm

85

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Berkowitz, D. (1991). Assessing forces in the selection o f local television news. Journal
o f Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 35, 361-364.
Blascovich, J.& Mendes,W.B. (2000). Challenge and threat appraisals: The role o f
affective cues. In J.P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role o f affect in
social cognition, pp.59-82. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Bolls, P.D., Lang, A., & Potter, R.F. (2001). The effects o f message valence and listener
arousal on attention, memory, and facial muscular responses to radio
advertisements. Communication Research, 28, 627-651.
Bower, G.H. (1981). Mood and memory. American Psychologist, 36, 129-148.
Castano, E., Yzerbyt, V., Paladino, M., Y Sacchi, S. (2002). I belong, therefore I exist:
Ingroup identifcation, ingroup entitavity, and ingroup bias. Personality and
Social Psychology Bulletin, 2, 135-143.
Cattell, R.B. & Scheier, I.H. (1961). The meaning and measure o f neuroticism and
anxiety. New York: Ronald Press.
Converse, P.E. (1964). The nature o f belief systems in mass publics. In D.E. Apter (Ed.)
Ideology and Discontent, pp. 206-261. New York: Free Press.
Darwin, C. (1899). The expression o f emotions in man and animals. New York:
Appleton and Company. Retrieved June 1,2006 from NetLibrary Database.
Dechesne, M., Janseen, J., & van Knippenberg, A. (2000). Derogation and distancing
as terror management strategies: The moderating role o f need for closure and
permeability o f group boundaries. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology,
79, 923-932.
Duffy, E. (1962). Activation and behavior. New York: Wiley.
Dweck, C.S. (1991). Self-theories and goals: Their role in motivation, personality, and
development. In R. Dienstbier (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation.
Lincoln, Nebraska: Nebraska University Press.
Ekman, P. (1999). Basic emotions. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), Handbook o f
Cognition and Emotion. New York: Wiley.
Ekman, P. & Friesen, W.V. (1978). Facial Action Coding System: A technique fo r the
measurement o f facial movement. Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Eysenck, M.W. (1992). Anxiety: The Cognitive Perspective. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.

86

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Erk, S., Kiefer, M., Grothe, J., Wunderlich, A.P., Spitzer, M., Walter, H. (2003).
Emotional context modulates subsequent memory effect. Neuroimage, 18, 439447.
Feldman Barrett, L. & Russell, J.A. (1999). The structure o f current affect: Controversies
and emerging consensus. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 10-14.
Ferre, P. (2003). Effects o f level o f processing on memory for affectively valenced
words. Cognition and Emotion, 17, 859-880.
Florian, V., Mikulincer, M., & Hirschberger, G. (2002). The anxiety buffering function
o f close relationships: Evidence that relationship commitment acts as a terror
management mechanism. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 82,
527-542.
Fransson, A. (1977). On qualitative differences in learning IV: Effects o f intrinsic
motivation and extrinsic anxiety on process and outcome. British Journal o f
Educational Psychology, 47, 244-257.
Frijda, N.H. (1988). The laws o f emotion. American Psychologist, 43, 349-358.
Frijda, N.H. (1986). The emotions. London: Cambridge University Press.
Gosling, S.D., Renfrow, P.J., & Swann, W.B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure o f the
Big Five Personality Domains. Journal o f Research in Personality, 37, 504-528.
Grabe, M.E., Lang, A. & Zhao, X. (2003). News content and form: Implications for
memory and audience evaluation. Communication Research, 30, 387-413.
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S. (1986).the causes and consequences o f a
need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In R.F. Baumeister (Ed.),
Public S e lf and Private S e lf New York: Springer-Verlag.
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S.,
& Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects o f
mortality salience on reactiosn to those two threaten or bolster the cultural
worldview. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 308-318.
Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role o f
consciousness and accessibility o f death-related thoughts in mortality salience
effects. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 627-637.
Hansen, C.H. & Hansen, R.D. (1988). Finding the face in the crowd: an angersuperiority effect. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 917-924.

87

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Capelos, T., & Provost, C. (2002). The consequences o f
terrorism: Disentangling the effects o f personal and national threat. Political
Psychology, 23, 485-509.
Idzihowski, C. & Baddeley, A. (1987). Fear and performance in novice parachutists.
Ergonomics, 30, 1463-1474.
Isen, A. (1987). Positive affect, cognitive processes, and social behavior. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 20, pp. 203253). New York: Academic Press.
Izard, C.E. (1991). The psychology o f emotion. New York: Plenum Press.
Izard, C.E. (1971). The Face o f Emotion. New York: Meredith Corporation.
Izard, C.E., Nagler, S., Randall, D., & Fox, J. (1965). The effects o f affective picture
stimuli on learning, perception, and the affective values o f previously neutral
symbols. In S.S. Tomkins & C.E. Izard (Eds.) Affect, cognition, and personality
(pp.42-70). New York: Springer.
Janis, I. & Feshbach, S. (1953). Effects o f fear-arousing communications. Journal o f
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 48, 78-92.
Jarvis, W.B.G. & Petty, R.E. (1996). The need to evaluate. Journal o f Personality and
Social Psychology, 70, 172-194.
Jonas, E., Schimel, J., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2002). The Scrooge effect:
Evidence that mortality salience increases prosocial attitudes and behavior.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 1342-1353.
Jost, J.T. & Sidanius, J. (2004). Political Psychology: Key Readings. New York:
Psychology Press.
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (1982). Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kent, (1985). M emory o f dental pain. Pain, 21, 187-194.
Kyrios, M. & lob, M.A. (1998). Automatic and strategic processing in obsessivecompulsive disorder: Attentional bias, cognitive avoidance, or more complex
phenomena? Journal o f Anxiety Disorders, 12, 271-292.
Larsen, R.J. & Diener, E. (1992). Promises and problems with the circumplex model o f
emotion. In M.S. Clark (Ed.), Review ofpersonality and social psychology:
Emotion. (Vol. 13, pp. 25-59). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

88

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Lazarus, R.S. (1995). Vexing problems inherent in cognitive-mediational theories of
emotion, and some solutions. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 183-196.
LeDoux, J.E. (1995). Emotion: Clues from the brain. Annual Review o f Psychology, 46,
209-235.
MacLeod,C., Mathews, A., & Tata, P. (1986). Attentional bias in emotional disorders.
Journal o f Abnormal Psychology, 95,15-20.
Marcus, G.E. & MacKuen, M. (1993). Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the vote: The emotional
underpinnings o f learning and involvement during presidential campaigns.
American Political Science Review, 87, 672-685.
Marcus, G.E., Neuman, W.R., & MacKuen, M. (2000). Affective Intelligence and
Political Judgment. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
Marcus, G.E., Wood, S.L., & Theiss-Morse, E. (1998). Linking neuroscience to political
intolerance and judgment. Politics and the Life Science, 17, 165-178.
Matthews, G. (1993). Biases in processing emotional information. The Psychologist, 6,
493-499.
Matthews, G. (1990). W hy worry?: The cognitive function o f anxiety. Behavior
Research and Therapy, 28, 455-468.
Matthews, G. & Wells, A. (1999). The cognitive science o f attention and emotion. In T.
Dalgleish and M. Power (Eds.) Handbook o f Cognition and Emotion. New York:
John W iley and Sons.
Mayer, J. & Gaschke, Y.N. (1988). The experience and meta-experience o f mood.
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 102- 111.
McGregor, H., Lieberman, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Arndt, J., Simon, L., et al.
(1998). Terror management and aggression: Evidence that mortality salience
promotes aggression toward worldview-threatening individuals. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 590-605.
Miller, S.E. (1996). Monitoring and blunting o f threatening information: Cognitive
interference and facilitation in the coping process. In I.G. Sarason, G.R. Pierce,
and B.R. Sarason (Eds.), Cognitive Interference: Theories, Methods, and
Findings. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Miller, S.E. (1987). Monitoring and blunting: Validation o f a questionnaire to assess
styles o f information seeking under threat. Journal o f Personality and Social
Psychology, 52, 345-353.

89

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Mogg, K. & Bradley, B.P. (1999). Selective attention and anxiety: A cognitivemotivational perspective. In T. Dalgleish & M. Power (Eds.), Handbook o f
Cognition and Emotion. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Mogg, K., Bradley, B.P., McNamara, J., Powys, M., Rawlinson, H., & Seiffer, A. (2000).
Selective attention to threat: A test o f two cognitive models o f anxiety.
Cognition and Emotion, 14, 375-399.
Nelson, L.J., Moore, D.L., Olivetti, J., & Scott, T. (1997). General and personal
mortality salience and nationalistic bias. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 23, 884-892.
Norton, G.R., Schaefer, E., Cox, B.J., Dowrawrd, J. & Wozney, K. (1988). Selective
memory effects in nonclinical panickers. Journal o f Anxiety Disorders, 2, 169177.
Plutchik, R. (1962). The emotions: Facts, theories, and a new model. New York:
Random House.
Procopio, C.H. & Procopio, S.T. (2007). Do you know what it means to miss
New Orleans? Internet communication, geographic community, and social capital
in crisis. Journal o f Applied Communication Research, 35, 67-87.
Pyszczynski, T. & Greenberg, J. (1987). Self-regulatory preservation and the depressive
self-focusing style: A self-awareness theory o f the development and maintenance
o f reactive depression. Psychological Bulletin, 102, 122-138.
Pyszczynski, T. & Greenberg, J. (1992). Hanging on and letting go: Understanding the
onset, progression, and remission o f depression. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2003). In the wake o f 9/11: The
psychology o f terror. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Pyszczynski, T., Wicklund, Floresku, S., Gauch, G., Koch, H., Solomon, S., et al.
(1996). Whistling in the dark: Exaggerated consensus estimates in response to
incidental reminders o f mortality. Psychological Science, 7, 332-336.
Quattrone, G.A. & Tversky, A. (1988). Contrasting rational and psychological analyses
o f political choice. American Political Science Review, 52,716-736.
Reed, G.F. (1977). Obsessional cognition: Performance on two numerical tasks. British
Journal o f Psychiatry, 130, 184-185.
Reidy, J. & Richards, A. (1997). Anxiety and memory: A recall bias for threatening
words in high anxiety. Behavioral Research and Therapy, 35, 531-542.

90

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Reisenzein, R. (1994). Pleasure-activation theory and the intensity o f emotions. Journal
o f Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 525-539.
Rosenblatt, A., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Lyon, D. (1989). Evi
dence for terror management theory I: The effects o f mortality salience on
reactions to those who violate or uphold cultural values. Journal o f Personality
and Social Psychology, 57, 681-690.
Russell, J.A. (2003). Core affect and the psychological construction o f emotion.
Psychological Review, 110, 145-172.
Russell, J.A. (1980). A circumplex model o f affect. Journal o f Personality and
Social Psychology, 39, 1161-1178.
Sarason, I.G. (1984). Stress, anxiety, and cognitive interference: Reactions to tests.
Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 929-938.
Schimel, J., Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Waxmonsky, J.,
& Arndt, J. (1999). Stereotypes and terror management: Evidence that mortality
salience enhances stereotypic thinking and preferences. Journal o f Personality
and Social Psychology, 77, 905-926.
Sears, D.O., Huddy, L., & Jervis, R. (2003). The Oxford Handbook o f Political
Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shapiro, T. & Emde, R. (1993). Affect: Psychoanalytical perspectives. Madison, CT:
International Universities Press.
Shoemaker, P, Chang, T., & Brendlinger, N. (1987). Deviance as a predictor o f
newsworthiness: In M. McLaughlin (Ed.), Communication Yearbook, 10,
(pp. 348-365). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Simon, H. (1955). A behavioral model o f rational choice. Quarterly Journal o f
Economics, 69, 99-118.
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory o f
social behavior: The psychological functions o f self-esteem and cultural
worldviews. In Mark P. Zanna (Ed.) Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, vol. 24, pp. 93-159.
Spencer, H. (1890) The principles o f psychology, Vol. 1. New York: Appleton.
Stanton, J. (2002, February). US fears proliferation o f ‘orphan’ nukes. National Defense
Magazine. Retrieved August 9, 2006 from http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.
org/issues/2002/Feb/US_Fears.htm

91

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

Steptoe, A. (1989). An abbreviated version o f the Miller Behavioral Style Scale. British
Journal o f Clinical Psychology, 28, 183-184.
Taubman Ben-Ari, O., Florian, V., & Mikulincer, M. (1999). The impact o f mortality
salience on reckless driving: A test o f terror management mechanisms. Journal
o f Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 35-45.
Tumulty, K., Novak, V., Barnes, S., Baron, M., Bower, A., Carney, J., Healy, R., Sieger,
M., & Underwood, J. (2003, June 2). Goodbye soccer mom, hello security mom.
Time, 26-30.
Watson, D., Clark, L.A., & Tellegren, A. (1987). Development and validation o f brief
measures o f positive and negative affect: The PANAS scales. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 1063-1070.
Wundt, W. (1896). Outlines o f Psychology. (C.H. Judd, Trans.) New York: Stechert.
Yik, S.M., Russell, J.A., & Feldman Barrett, L. (1999). Structure o f self-reported current
affect: Integration and beyond. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
600-619.
Zajonc, R.B. (1998). Emotions. In D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.) The
Handbook o f Social Psychology, 4th Edition, vol. 1. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Zeelenberg, R, Wagenmakers, E.J., & Rotteveel, M. (2006). The impact o f emotion on
perception. Psychological Science, 17, 287-291.

92

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

APPENDICES

93

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

APPENDIX A

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW DOCUMENTS

94

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

U s n v m n v a/ N tw H am fshuu
f

n g iim S i m M
Piftfisiiii^ Cswifit Mil
OwtMMn^, f#»«l#?*f

Study:
ip p iw iiO a iti

Aiwiily ,?" d Seie* v** rnf«n ra?-<y'<fxposuri
a ; / : j;2ua/

t n « ‘ P V y ib u f f r y y L H 'p a r V f jn s t« i R ev-<~w tio'M H*. i i n > , ,1 w t k o n t - 'n i f t . 'e <'«f t h e frftttU ttK jN i.it

iiwitw (iftirti |lf !i| ftpr iltt fcsltCliiW u t Ht.tran Siitr.-m r*
mv^-wei? .isi!
opt'wuwd lN» proUwo*
pitjf s'tidy 4'* if
•*’<d»“rfii‘>'d in f rd#*?4 l Mryui.itiufH 4*1 ffP
#§, Stiliiictlfii I®! (M|S:
!

ft ;<< y r y r i i <♦(} I n ? i w h I . k * W
- " H U * ,! n r *

S io v

1 /

U

,i'. d < « ,i
.%

M i / r ' t t s f t c e f 'o ;

rf* y i i n f p f C . H r v .
!<<V1« a

a n d

.tp p f u v .s

(I?'*t ‘

p o u t

ip y o u )

III lt« 4 f

inpiiiiwitiite*
if

!>**s‘

' a t h y s l s - n y u i t r c t t i d y f t .r* a r i t j « r s | y r o t f ', * . 1*.^ w h s d * y o u h i t #

pffenvy flW pmM^. Ill rwtfivfl)

to? ¥»“* F«?«'f>;, yw» IHjicn tv tor^wt the

p « | W t l « « f . r . i r d ^ t r r i f w i t h ( I k * e f M <*•
v m | i i n 11‘M M *t.® -c. r',* v , n l r t f \n s h e
%--\uy, i’, ,^.viable c*'> v * ' Oflx.i' <f

1
GSft,
T ir--*

’■*ft.yyv,'A
% * <s

«**<$ < r « i r : ' r r % ?»»• t * e ; * o t *<«.,{ m * * « t H - * o » i o
H r 't i o n * P ^ : 4 -

!?•<■* fu ll U ‘i»t a* t o o tSHfnw n?

;/•*«! Hr-v.m r 'OSRt wbp,«ir* i t
w'« '’wKit^H <4 by '
’’....... " ............... "

th<*

f t . ) y i « i i „> p y * v . < > , t i t - y y t { o *>'.«, { i s n ' t t t ! « * p o p o n p f u j o d < . > i p n ' t i n f t

ifi¥
<ti v) • '-4“t *. p-d.kt rcvsd** ‘«rtti
V» »hf
c' t i y i r U P ' . »adJ]s’*?/». Ptn.r !*icjkrt %w(» r^crd*. t o ?*v» oKfe f»» npliy o*>*,v"y ! « v > i i ,
ym

iM p trttn O I

V fm hm e
c o n ta c t»

q w 'Ah w

m t

r , Y v „ f y o u r p r t ; y <:t

4

jf, p l e * i ‘ f e o i t n ^ * t o

ffWiter <1 lilt fSy- *»y'oyy Dofturtrr-<*-Mi Hi y»«w Conrtnmct*.

F e r r o SRfe,
l ,I

,

#*

lit

I f§

J k r ? f , S ffrro c n '

n ■ i fir*

Research Comtuctanti tem pH m w f€fyic«* Office of Sp»is«nrt R m m w ^
Servke BwiWlftp, S i Ccrflego R«a4 Oortwm, NM B3»24-»Si$ « Fan? 6 # 3-«® l-li«#

95

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

^

INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
Purpose:

The purpose of this research is to understand how people learn information from
internet news sources

Description:

In this study, you will be asked to read an online news article about a current
news issue.. You will be asked some questions about your mood before and
after reading the article. After reading the article, you will have some time to
explore a website that contains further information. Just as real-life news stories
can make you feel uneasy or worried, the article and website may also make you
feel uneasy or worried, but not more uncomfortable or anxious than a typical
news broadcast. Participation in this study should take about 1.5 hours. If you
choose not to participate, you will be given an alternative project to fulfill the
course requirement.

PLEA SE R E A P T H E FOLLOW ING STA TEM EN TS AND R E S P O N D A S T O W H E T H E R O R NOT YOU ARE
WILLING TO PA RTICIPA TE:

1. I understand that the use of human subjects in this project has been approved by the
UNH Psychology Department Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human
Subjects.
2. I understand the scope, aims, and purposes of this research project and the procedures
to be followed (including identification of any treatments or procedures which are
experimental) and the expected duration of my participation.
3. I have received a description of any potential benefits that may be accrued from this
research and understand how they may affect me or others.
4. I understand that the confidentiality of all data and records associated with my
participation in this research, including my identity, will be fully maintained
5. I understand that my consent to participate in this research is entirely voluntary, and that
my refusal to participate will involve no prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which I would
otherwise be entitled.
6. I further understand that if I consent to participate, I may discontinue my participation at
any time without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which I would otherwise be entitled.
7. I confirm that no coercion of any kind was used in seeking my participation in this
research project.
8. I understand that if I have any questions pertaining to the research, my rights as a
research subject, or any research related injury, I have the right to contact the experimenter,
Melissa Surawski (Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu) or Julie Simpson in the office of Sponsored
Research at 2-3564 and have the opportunity to discuss them in confidence.
9. I understand that I will not be provided financial incentive for my participation by the
University of New Hampshire.

10. I understand that any information gained about me as a result of my participation will be
provided to me at the conclusion of my involvement in this research project if I request such.
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11.1 certify that I have read and fully understand the purpose of this research project and its
risks and benefits for me as stated above.
I,_____________________

Consent/Agree to participate in this research project

I,_____________________ Refuse/Do Not Agree to participate in this research project

signature of participant

date
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Debriefing Form: Manipulation 1
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose o f this experiment is
to learn more about people’s preference for further information after their sense o f safety
is threatened. You were in the control condition, which means you did not read an article
that contained threatening information. Your responses to the surveys and your websitesearching behavior will be compared with the responses and behavior o f the other
participants who did receive a threatening message. We predict that individuals will
differ in the amount o f information they want and the type o f information they want after
receiving a message that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power
plants cannot explode like nuclear bombs, and so would not be considered effective
terrorist targets. If you have any further questions about the nature o f this study or the
issue that you read about while participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter,
Melissa Surawski, at Surawski@cisunix.imh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie
Simpson at the Office o f Sponsored Research at 2-3564.

Debriefing Form: Manipulation 2
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose o f this experiment is
to learn more about people’s preference for further information after their sense o f safety
is threatened. You were in one o f our moderate-anxiety conditions: although you were
reading about a nearby power plant, you received a message that nuclear power plants are
generally safe. Your responses to the surveys and your website-searching behavior will
be compared with the responses and behavior o f the other participants who received
different types o f safety messages. We predict that individuals will differ in the amount
o f information they want and the type o f information they want after receiving a message
that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power plants cannot explode
like nuclear bombs, and so would not be considered effective terrorist targets. It should
also be noted that Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant has an impeccable safety record. If you
have any further questions about the nature o f this study or the issue that you read about
while you were participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter, Melissa
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Surawski, at Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie Simpson at
the Office o f Sponsored Research at 2-3564.

Special instructions: Debriefing participants in manipulations 3 and 4 will have an oral
component. Participants will be given the following documents to read. They will then
be orally presented with the following information:
1. The purpose o f this study is to learn more about the way people process
information that is scary or threatening to their sense o f safety. In order to test
our hypotheses, we needed to create articles that would really make you feel
anxious. Not all o f the information that you read today is true. What you read
was an article written by the experimenter.
2. Although we cannot guarantee that nuclear terrorism will never happen, it is
very unlikely that terrorists would attack a nuclear power plant.
a. Nuclear reactors cannot explode like nuclear bombs. They contain an
different type o f energy.
b. Even if it did, there are multiple layers o f protection that would absorb
the fire and radiation
c. In the unlikely circumstance that radiation did escape into the
atmosphere, it would not result in immediate, instant death for millions
o f people. The effects o f radiation are very serious, but not nearly as
destructive as this article described. In the only nuclear incident in
history in which radiation escaped, only about 60 people died. The
cancer rate did increase in the area, but only by 13%.
d. Seabrook has an absolutely impeccable safety record. Although we do
know that plans o f US nuclear power plants were found in
Afghanistan, there is no evidence that Seabrook was one o f those
plants, and there has never been a specific threat against the Seabrook
plant.
e. Radiation escaping from Seabrook would actually not travel very far.
Terrorists seeking maximum impact would not likely use a nuclear

99

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

power plant and are even less likely to use the Seabrook plant. There
are plants that are much closer to metropolitan areas,
f.

It is really important to the integrity o f the experiment that you do not
talk about this study with anyone who may participate. Please wait to
discuss this study until January.

Debriefing Form: Manipulation 3
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of this experiment is to leam
more about people’s preference for further information after their sense of safety is threatened.
You were in one of our moderate-anxiety conditions: you read about the risks that nuclear power
plants pose to their surrounding communities. Your responses to the surveys and your websitesearching behavior will be compared with the responses and behavior of the other participants
who received different types of safety messages. We predict that individuals will differ in the
amount of information they want and the type of information they want after receiving a message
that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power plants cannot explode like
bombs, and so would not be considered effective terrorist targets. If you have any further
questions about the nature of this study or the issue that you read about while you were
participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter, Melissa Surawski, at
Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie Simpson at the Office of
Sponsored Research at 2-3564.

Debriefing Form: Manipulation 4
Thank you for your participation in this study. The purpose of this experiment is to leam more
about people’s preference for further information after their sense of safety is threatened. You
were in our high-anxiety condition: you read about the [fictional] safety threats that the Seabrook
Nuclear Power Plant poses to its surrounding community. Your response to the surveys and your
website searching behavior will be compared with the responses and behavior of the other
participants who received different types of safety messages. We predict that individuals will
differ in the amount of information they want and the type of information they want after
receiving a message that they may not be safe. It should be noted that nuclear power plants
absolutely cannot explode like bombs, and so would not be considered effective terrorist targets.
It should also be noted that the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant has an impeccable record of safety.
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If you have any further questions about the nature of this study or the issue that you read about
while you were participating, please feel free to contact the experimenter, Melissa Surawski,
at Surawski@cisunix.unh.edu. Additionally, you may contact Julie Simpson at the Office of
Sponsored Research at 2-3564.
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APPENDIX B

DEVELOPMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION

In order to allow the theory o f affective intelligence (Marcus, Neuman, &
MacKuen, 2000) and terror management theory (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszcyznski,
1991, 2003) to be directly compared, the issue to be used in the anxiety manipulation had
to meet three criteria: first, it had to arouse sufficient anxiety to affect the behavior o f the
participants. Second, the issue had to arouse anxiety specifically about the possibility o f
the participants’ own death. Third, because it would have to be convincingly
manipulated by the experimenters, the issue could not be one o f which college students
typically report having a lot o f information. Over the course o f several brainstorming
sessions, a number o f possible issues were identified as possible candidates, and were
then pretested for the amount o f anxiety they might arise, the level o f knowledge the
participants m ay have about the issue, and the realism o f the issue.

Method
Participants
The participants in the study consisted o f volunteers from 2 psychology courses at
the University o f New Hampshire, a course in Psychology Statistics and a course in child
development. In total, 77 students participated in this pretest. Although demographic
data were not reliably collected (many students failed to report their gender, age, and year
in school on their surveys), the majority o f the participants were female, underclassmen,
and psychology majors. In exchange for participating in the study, students in the Child
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Development course earned course credit, while the data provided by the students in the
Statistics course was subsequently analyzed themselves in class demonstrations.
Participation was optional for students in both courses, but no students refused to
participate.
Procedure
The participants were told that the purpose o f the pretest was to identify an issue
that arouses anxiety to be used in a dissertation on the effect o f anxiety on the search for
information. They were told that participation was optional and that if they did not wish
to participate, they should simply leave their consent forms and survey packets blank and
hand them in with the rest o f the students. They were asked to read the instructions
carefully, to include their age, gender, and year in college on the back o f the survey, and
that they could begin when they were ready.
Materials
The survey completed by the participants was designed to test for differences
between 5 issues on their ability to arouse anxiety, their realism, and the extent o f
background information about the issue possessed by college students. The pretested
issues included the reinstitution o f the draft for male and female US citizens over the age
o f 18 and regardless o f college status, contamination o f US food and water supplies with
chemical or biological agents by terrorists, increasing chatter detected on terrorist
networks which may indicate the planning o f an attack, the operation o f US ports by
companies based in countries affiliated with terrorism, the construction o f a bioterrorism
laboratory in nearby Boston that would house dangerous toxins such as the ebola virus,
smallpox, and anthrax, and the safety o f nuclear power plants, including the plant roughly
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ten miles from the University o f New Hampshire campus. Additionally, the pretest
contained two brief scenarios involving the release o f stolen toxins from the bioterrorism
laboratory in crowded, public places and the meltdown o f the Seabrook Nuclear Power
Plant caused by terrorists slamming a commercial airplane into the nuclear reactor.
Mostly, the participants used 5-point Likert scales to rate the issues, but they were also
asked to rank the issues according to how much anxiety they would arouse. When rating
the scenarios, the participants were also asked to provide ratings o f the probability o f the
events occurring in real life, the probability that they would die if the scenario did occur
in real life, and the probability that people they cared about would die if the scenario
occurred in real life.

Results
In order to determine which issue was reported to cause the most anxiety, a one
way ANOVA was run on the anxiety ratings for each o f the issues. Overall, the draft
and food contamination were found to be significantly higher in anxiety ratings than
nuclear power plant safety, the construction o f a bioterrorism laboratory, and control o f
US ports by companies affiliated with terrorism, F(4,456)=17.05, p<.001. Please see table
A -l for the means.
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Table A1
Means and standard deviations o f anxiety ratings o f pretest issues
Issue
Reinstution o f draft
Contamination o f food sources
Increased terrorist chatter
Arab control o f US ports
Construction o f bioterrorism lab
Nuclear power plant safety
Note. xs. = 11

Mean

Std Dev
3.14
3.09
2.74
2.36
2.13
2.12

0.11
1.04
0.97
1.00
0.85
0.95

Although the draft aroused the most anxiety, it was also the issue that college
students reported themselves o f having the most knowledge, M=3.43, s=1.13 and was
significantly higher than any other issue on this dimension, F(5,456) = 28.34, p<.001.
Thus, it was eliminated from the pool o f potential issues to be used in the anxiety
manipulation. The students reported knowing significantly less information about the
construction o f the bioterrorism laboratory than nuclear power plant safety, Arab control
o f US ports, and contamination o f US food and water supplies. Please refer to table A-2
for the means.
Table A2
Means and standard deviations for knowledge ratings o f
pretest issues
Issue
Reinstitution o f draft
Increased terrorist chatter
Contamination o f food sources
Arab control o f US ports
Nuclear power plant safety
Nuclear power plant safety

Mean
3.43
2.60
2.47
2.40
2.30
1.23

Std Dev
1.13
1.30
1.12
1.40
1.81
0.67

Note, n = 77
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Although participants were also asked to rate how much they worried about each
of the issues, no significant differences were found.
The low knowledge ratings for the nuclear power plant safety and bioterrorism
laboratory construction made them appealing because they could presumably be
manipulated in a convincing manner. Although these issues received low anxiety ratings,
it may be the case that when more detailed information is presented about them,
participants would find them more frightening and anxiety-provoking. This hypothesis
was tested by presenting participants with brief scenarios involving widespread disaster
caused by terrorist activity involving both issues. After reading each hypothesis,
participants were asked to rate how anxiety-provoking, realistic, and frightening they
were using a 5-point Likert scale. Only one significant difference was found: the nuclear
power plant issue was found to be significantly more anxiety-producing than the
bioterrorism laboratory scenario, F(l,149)=4.33, p<.05. Please see table A-3 for the
means.
Table A3
Means and standard deviations for anxiety, realism, and frightening ratings o f pretest scenarios
Anxiety
Std
Dev
Mean

Issue
Nuclear
3.89*
1.08
Biolab
3.53*
1.06
Note. *significant at p<.05

Realism
Std
Mean
Dev
2.68
1.00
2.57
0.90

Fright
Std
Mean
Dev
3.84
1.14
3.60
1.05

To further assess the level o f anxiety and realism that each o f the scenarios may
induce, participants were also asked to rate, on a 100-point scale, the probability that the
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scenario would occur, the likelihood that they would die if the scenario occurred, and the
likelihood that someone that they cared about would die if the scenario occurred.
Although no significant differences were found between the issues in terms o f the
likelihood o f their occurrence in real life, participants rated the probability that they and
someone they cared about would die in the nuclear scenario significantly higher than in
the bioterrorism laboratory example, F(l,142)=17.18, p<.001. Please refer to table A-4
for the means.
Table A4
Means and standard deviations o f the probability ratings for scenario
occurrence, participants’ death in scenario, and death o f others in scenario
Occurrence

Own Death

Others' Death

Issue

Mean

Std D ev

Mean

Std D ev

Mean

Std D ev

Nuclear

33.39

22.25

72.60*

28.14

77.58*

28.26

Biolab

31.34

22.44

53.33*

27.61

63.63*

29.38

Note. *significant at p<.05

Discussion
It appears, then, that when participants are asked to read about a scenario
involving nuclear power plant safety, at least a moderate amount o f anxiety is aroused.
Furthermore, they perceive the scenario to be somewhat realistic and the possibility o f
their own death and the deaths o f those they care about as very real.
Nuclear power plant safety did rank at the bottom o f a list o f issues that
participants were asked to rate in terms o f their ability to arouse anxiety. However, this
task required only that participants read the list o f issues, which did not contain any
further information other than, for example, “nuclear power plant safety (there is a
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nuclear power plant roughly 10 miles from the UNH Durham campus).” The most likely
explanation for these results is that the participants in the pretest failed to imagine any
dangerous situation that may arise from a nuclear power plant in the vicinity, while the
other issues they were asked to rate contained more obvious potential for disaster that did
not need to be explained to the participants.
The participants’ seeming unawareness o f the potential danger associated with
nuclear power plants in a terrorist situation will allow the issue to be manipulated
convincingly. If the idea that terrorists might fly a jet plane into a nearby nuclear reactor
had never occurred to them before, the participants may be more likely to feel anxiety.
On the other hand, if the participants are familiar with a certain scenario, they may not be
readily convinced that the information being presented to them is factual or even
believable, and the anxiety manipulation would fail.
Although the results o f this present pretest appear somewhat contradictory, they
did reveal that the nuclear power plant scenario could arouse anxiety in participants and
could also be potentially manipulated in a convincing manner, two conditions necessary
for the study being proposed.
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APPENDIX C

EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION ARTICLES

Condition 1: Safe Message, No Personal Threat
Protests Planned at US Nuclear Plants
Washington, D.C.
Protesters are planning rallies outside several o f the nation’s nuclear power plant
facilities on Saturday. Members o f the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), an
grassroots organization trying to end the use o f nuclear power, are invoking the risk
posed to nuclear facilities by terrorists in order to gamer wider support for its cause.
“Nuclear reactors are high-value targets for terrorists determined to inflict largescale death and destruction” read a statement published on CAN’s website.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, long-standing concerns about the
vulnerability o f U.S. nuclear power plants have been resurfaced.
Robert Wallis, chair o f the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards at the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission says that the risks posed to nuclear power facilities
by terrorists is greatly overstated. “Reactors are extremely well-protected. There is
virtually no chance o f a terrorist being able to blow up a reactor.”
According to the World Association o f Nuclear Operators regulation that has been
in place since 1966, multiple levels o f large physical barriers must be in place to protect
reactors. The reactor vessell, which is immediately surrounded by water that will disolve
any escaped radiation, is encased in walls that are 3.6 feet thick and made o f leaded
concrete and lined by steel. Three more concrete walls and a steel shield offer further
protection inside the reactor structure. Finally, the entire reactor structure is protected by
a dry well well wall made o f steel and concrete that is 4.5 feet thick.
Extensive tests have shown that an airplane crashing into the dry well wall cannot
penetrate to the reactor. Scientists have calculated the force with which commercial-sized
airplanes would hit the outside reactor wall travelling at different speeds and have failed
to find any evidence that enough force would be generated to cause even moderate
damage. In fact, a test was carried out in which an unmanned plane was flown into a
replica o f an outside reactor wall. The collision caused a dent that was only 60 milimeters
deep.
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Furthermore, it is unlikely that terrorists would use an airplane to blow up a
nuclear reactor -airplanes heavy enough to have a strong impact have wingspans that are
much larger than reactor structures, making it very difficult to hit a target. Further
evidence that attacks to nuclear power plants would be ineffective comes from history:
during the Cold War, in which the threat o f nuclear war escalated, neither the United
States or Russia used each other’s nuclear power plants as potential targets.
Extensive studies after the only two nuclear accidents in history confirm that
widespread disaster would not occur even in the extremely unlikely event that terrorists
could penetrate the thick walls that protect the reactor. Studies after the Three Mile
Island incident showed that nearly all harmful fission products that escaped from the
reactor were dissolved immediately in the water surrounding the vessel. In fact,
radioactive material only penetrated a half centimeter o f the leaded concrete walls
immediately surrounding the reactor. No harmful products escaped even into the outer
parts o f the reactor structure, let alone the atmosphere, and no one was killed. Studies
after the 1986 Chernobyl incident, in which radiation was leaked into the atmosphere, has
shown no significant increase in mortality rates or cancer rates due to irradiation in the
vicinity o f the plant. Furthermore, the radiation levels o f the land surrounding the plant
have since returned to normal.
“It’s not surprising that some people overstate the concern about the terrorist
threat to nuclear power plants” said Robert Wallis. “What is surprising is that the
government has not made more o f an effort to educate its citizens about the reasons why
the threat o f such an attack is extremely low. To continue to let people believe that they
and the Earth are in mortal danger from events that cannot cause significant public harm
is to play into the hands o f terrorists by making a minor event a cause for life-endagering
panic. Now is the time to clear the air and speak a few simple and scientific truths.”

Condition 2: Safe Message, Personal Threat
Protests planned at Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant
Seabrook, NH
Protesters are planning rallies outside the nuclear power facility located in
Seabrook, NH on Saturday. Members o f the Citizens Awareness Network (CAN), an
grassroots organization trying to end the use o f nuclear power, are invoking the risk
posed to the facility by terrorists in order to gamer wider support for its cause.
“Nuclear reactors are high-value targets for terrorists determined to inflict largescale death and destruction” read a statement published on CAN’s website.
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, long-standing concerns about the
vulnerability o f Seabrook Nulear Power Plant have been resurfaced.
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Robert Wallis, chair o f the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards at the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission says that the risks posed to the Seabrook plant by
terrorists is greatly overstated. “That facility is extremely well-protected. There is
virtually no chance o f a terrorist being able to blow up the Seabrook reactor.”
The Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant was built in accordance with the World
Association o f Nuclear Operators regulation, which requires that multiple levels o f large
physical barriers must be in place to protect reactors. The reactor vessell, which is
immediately surrounded by water that will disolve any escaped radiation, is encased in
walls that are 3.6 feet thick and made o f leaded concrete and lined by steel. Three more
concrete walls and a steel shield offer further protection inside the reactor structure.
Finally, the entire reactor structure is protected by a dry well well wall made o f steel and
concrete that is 4.5 feet thick.
Extensive tests have shown that an airplane crashing into the dry well wall, such
as the one at the Seabrook facility, cannot penetrate to the reactor. Scientists have
calculated the force with which commercial-sized airplanes would hit the outside reactor
wall travelling at different speeds and have failed to find any evidence that enough force
would be generated to cause even moderate damage. In fact, a test was carried out in
which an unmanned plane was flown into a replica o f the outside reactor wall. The
collision caused a dent that was only 60 milimeters deep.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that terrorists would use an airplane to blow up The
Seabrook nuclear reactor -airplanes heavy enough to have a strong impact have
wingspans that are much larger than reactor structures, making it very difficult to hit it as
a target. Further evidence that an attack to a nuclear power plant would be ineffective
comes from history: during the Cold War, in which the threat o f nuclear war escalated,
neither the United States or Russia used each other’s nuclear power plants as potential
targets.
Extensive studies after the only two nuclear accidents in history confirm that
widespread disaster would not occur even in the extremely unlikely event that terrorists
could penetrate the thick walls that protect the reactor. Studies after the Three Mile
Island incident showed that nearly all harmful fission products that escaped from the
reactor were dissolved immediately in the water surrounding the vessel. In fact,
radioactive material only penetrated a half centimeter o f the leaded concrete walls
immediately surrounding the reactor. No harmful products escaped even into the outer
parts o f the reactor structure, let alone the atmosphere, and no one was killed. Studies
after the 1986 Chernobyl incident, in which radiation was leaked into the atmosphere, has
shown no significant increase in mortality rates or cancer rates due to irradiation in the
vicinity o f the plant. Furthermore, the radiation levels o f the land surrounding the plant
have since returned to normal.
“It’s not surprising that some people overstate the concern about the terrorist
threat to Seabrook and the nation’s other nuclear power plants” says Robert Wallis.
“What is surprising is that the government has not made more o f an effort to educate its
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citizens about the reasons why the threat o f such an attack is extremely low. To continue
to let people believe that they and the Earth are in mortal danger from events that cannot
cause significant public harm is to play into the hands o f terrorists by making a minor
event a cause for life-endagering panic. Now is the time to clear the air and speak a few
simple and scientific truths.”

Condition 3: Unsafe Message, No Personal Threat
Report faults security at US Nuclear Power Plants
Washington, DC
Safety issues at the nation’s nuclear power facilities are raising concerns after a
government watchdog group published a disturbing report following an extensive study.
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) interviewed security guards at
several plants during the summer o f 2006 and found that they are under-manned, under
equipped, under-trained, under-paid, and unconfident that they could do anything to stop
a terrorist attack.
POGO’s findings are particularly disturbing after White House reports that
nuclear power plants are attractive targets and vulnerable to terrorists. In his 2002 State
of the Union address, President Bush revealed that diagrams o f the US nuclear power
plants had been found among other materials in Al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. In
April, the White House homeland security budget report identified nuclear power plants
as a most-likely terrorist target.
“Because most nuclear plants are close to major cities, I’d say that they’re a pretty
attractive target [for terrorists],” said Ted LaMont, head o f security at the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. “Add to that the fact that many o f the plants are right on the
coast, which means radiation can drift quite easily. You can see why the terrorists would
want to hit the nuclear plants. They could conceivably kill millions o f people in a single
attack.”
Although Congress recommended that security at nuclear power plants should be
tightened following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the POGO report found
very little progress in enhancing security measures.
Through interviews with security guards at several plants, POGO found that, on
average, only 5 guards are on duty to protect a facility at a time. Although armed, the
guards typically carry rifles - no match for the automatic weapons that terrorists would
likely use in an attack. Additionally, they receive very little training on their weapons;
while the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recommends 90 hours o f weapons
training per year, the average number o f hours reported by the guards was less than 3.
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“When I was in the army, I was trained on the same rifle that we use here,” said a
guard who has asked not to be identified. “The plant recently downgraded the scopes and
now I don’t know how to use them. I have no confidence that I would be able to hit a
stationary target from 20 feet away. Forget about a moving target. No way.”
The POGO report also noted that under current NRC regulations, guards are not
allowed to shoot at a target that does not appear to be carrying a gun. If a terrorist is
running towards a reactor with a backpack full o f explosives, the only legal course o f
action for the guard to take would be to call the local police.
The NRC commented that the role o f the guards is merely to delay an attack, not
to stop it outright. However, POGO has pointed out some problems with this security
plan as well. During routine testing o f the security teams at eleven plants, mock terrorists
were able to get by the guards and reach the reactor controls in less than 3 minutes, even
though the security teams were given advance notice o f the test and detailed plans o f the
mock attacks. Within another 5 minutes, a highly trained and suicidal terrorist team
would be able to cause a core-reactor meltdown, causing massive destruction.
According to the very same mock-terrorism test, it took local police, on average,
nearly an hour to assemble the SWAT team, arrive at the scene, be briefed on the
situation and location o f the intruders inside the building, familiarize themselves with the
layout o f the plant, coordinate their communication equipment, and devise and execute a
plan to stop them.
“It’s ludicrous that guards are dependent on local authorities to help them stop a
terrorist attack,” commented Paul Levesque, research professor o f nuclear physics at
Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. “Considering that a nuclear power plant
houses more than a thousand times the radiation as released in an atomic bomb, a single
attack at a nuclear plant could instantly incinerate more than 100,000 people. Even right
here, in my office, about 10 miles from a plant, I would be instantly incinerated. Stanford
would become one giant, burnt-out tomb. The destruction would stretch from the coasts
o f to the mountains to the cities further south along the coast, and that land would remain
barren and toxic for decades, if not longer.”
“The police and everyone else would be dead before they even knew what
happened,” commented a guard who took part in one o f the mock-terrorism exercises and
asked not to be identified.
The POGO report asked the guards how they felt about their responsibility for
keeping millions o f people safe from a terrorist attack. “I think it’s a sham. People
should know that they’re not giving us adequate weapons, that they don’t let us shoot,
that they don’t train us. I honestly think that if a van pulled up and 20 terrorist jumped
out, the guards would run for their lives,” said an unidentified guard.
On average, the guards at nuclear power plants earn $3 an hour less than the
custodians in the same plant. The annual turnover rate is 86%.
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Pinkerton Security, a security firm used by 70% o f the nation’s nuclear power
plants, declined to comment on the POGO report. The NRC, when reached for comment,
stated that they were in the planning stages o f their own investigation into the report.

Condition 4: Unsafe Message, Personal Threat
Report faults security at Seabrook Plant
Seabrook, NH
Safety issues at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Facility are raising concerns after a
government watchdog group published a disturbing report following an extensive study.
The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) interviewed security guards at the
Seabrook plant during the summer o f 2006 and found that they are under-manned, under
equipped, under-trained, under-paid, and unconfident that they could do anything to stop
a terrorist attack.
POGO’s findings are particularly disturbing after White House reports that
Seabrook is an attractive target and vulnerable to terrorists. In his 2002 State o f the
Union address, President Bush revealed that diagrams o f the Seabrook plant had been
found among other materials related to nuclear power in Al-Qaeda hideouts in
Afghanistan. In April, the White House homeland security budget report identified the
Seabrook facility as one o f the highest-risk plants, given its location roughly 30 miles
from the Boston metropolitan area.
“Because o f our proximity to Boston, I’d say that w e’re a pretty attractive target
[for terrorists],” said Ted LaMont, head o f security at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant.
“Add to that the fact that w e’re right on the coast and radiation can drift quite easily into
the New York area, and you see why the terrorists would want to hit us. They could
conceivably kill millions o f people in a single attack.”
Although Congress recommended that security at nuclear power plants should be
tightened following the terrorist attacks on September 11,2001, the POGO report found
very little progress in enhancing security measures at Seabrook.
Typically, only 5 guards are on duty at a time. Although armed, the guards carry
rifles - no match for the automatic weapons that terrorists would likely use in an attack.
Additionally, they receive very little training on their weapons; while the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) recommends 90 hours o f weapons training per year for
each security guard, the Seabrook guards reported getting less than 3.
“When I was in the army, I was trained on the same rifle that we use at
Seabrook,” said a guard who has asked not to be identified. “The plant recently
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downgraded the scopes and now I don’t know how to use them. I have no confidence
that I would be able to hit a stationary target from 20 feet away. Forget about a moving
target. No way.”
The POGO report also noted that under current NRC regulations, guards are not
allowed to shoot at a target that does not appear to be carrying a gun. If a terrorist is
running towards a reactor with a backpack full o f explosives, the only legal course o f
action for the guard to take would be to call the local police.
The NRC commented that the role o f the guards at the Seabrook facility is merely
to delay an attack, not to stop it outright. However, POGO has pointed out some
problems with this security plan as well. In a routine testing o f the security team at
Seabrook, mock terrorists were able to get by the guards and reach the reactor controls in
less than 3 minutes, even though security team was given advance notice o f the test and
detailed plans o f the mock attack. Within another 5 minutes, a highly trained and suicidal
terrorist team would be able to cause a core-reactor meltdown, causing massive
destmction.
According to the very same mock-terrorism test, it took police nearly an hour to
assemble the SWAT team, arrive at the scene, be briefed on the situation and location of
the intruders inside the building, familiarize themselves with the layout o f the plant,
coordinate their communication equipment, and devise and execute a plan to stop them.
“It’s ludicrous that guards are dependent on local authorities to help them stop a
terrorist attack,” commented Paul Levesque, research professor o f nuclear physics at the
nearby University o f New Hampshire. “Considering that a nuclear power plant houses
more than a thousand times the radiation as released in an atomic bomb, a single attack at
Seabrook could instantly incinerate more than 100,000 people. Even right here, in my
office, a few miles from the plant, I would be instantly incinerated. TJNH would become
one giant, burnt-out tomb. The destruction would stretch from the coasts o f Maine to the
mountains o f Vermont to the cities further south along the coast, and that land would
remain barren and toxic for decades, if not longer.”
“The police and everyone else would be dead before they even knew what
happened,” commented a guard who took part in the mock-terrorism exercise and asked
not to be identified.
The POGO report asked the guards how they felt about their responsibility for
keeping millions o f people safe from a terrorist attack. “I think it’s a sham. People
should know that they’re not giving us adequate weapons, that they don’t let us shoot,
that they don’t train us. I honestly think that if a van pulled up and 20 terrorist jumped
out, the guards would run for their lives,” said an unidentified guard.
The guards at Seabrook make $3 an hour less than the custodians in the same
plant. The annual turnover rate is 86%.
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Pinkerton Security, the security firm used by the Seabrook facility, declined to
comment on the POGO report. The NRC, when reached for comment, stated that they
were in the planning stages o f their own investigation into the report.
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APPENDIX D
EXPERIMENTAL WEBSITE

NHNe w s .com
s ill*

Is Nuclear Power Safe?
NHNm ts takes a special in-depth look at the issues surrounding this
controversial source of energy.

Rower

The Threat erf’Nudear
Terrorism

How We Protect Our
Nudear Rants

History of Safety:
Plant Records

How to Survive a
Nuclear Explosion

EdRorial*. Are
Terrorists Targeting
Nudear Rants?

Benefits of Nuclear

« families fir* Is Vital Ur*
in Children’s Health
■ Iraq’s Top Cultural Official Resigns
■ Mexico Section Court to Rule on
Recount
■ Setting Real About the Real Estate
Bubble

*

■ Nerds Sees Successor to VSoxx

Victims’ Voices:
Chernobyl

What Happens In a
Nuclear Explosion?
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APPENDIX E

MEASURES

Brief Mood Introspection Scale
INSTRUCTIONS: Choose the response on the scale that indicates how well each
adjective or phrase describes your PRESENT MOOD STATE.
XX
X
V
VV

= Definitely DO NOT feel
= DO NOT feel
= Slightly feel
= Definitely feel
1. Lively
a. (1) Definitely DO NOT feel
b. (2) DO NOT feel
c. (3) Slightly feel
d. (4) Definitely feel
2. Happy
a. Etc.
3. Sad
4. Tired
5. Caring
6. Content
7. Gloomy
8. Jittery
9. Drowsy
10. Grouchy
11. Peppy
12. Nervous
13. Calm
14. Loving
15. Fed-up
16. Active

Overall, my mood is:
V ery unpleasant
V ery Pleasant
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Bound Anxiety Measure
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Instructions: Choose the response on the scale that indicates how well each phrase
describes how you feel right now:
XX = Definitely NO NOT feel
X = DO NOT feel
V = Slightly feel
VV = Definitely feel
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Anxious about terrorism or other catastrophic events
Satisfied with the precautions the government is taking to keep our homeland safe
Afraid o f events that I cannot control
Scared that my family, friends, and I are not really safe
Upset about the damage to our environment
Pleased with nuclear power as a clean, sustainable, and safe energy source
Worried that it is only a matter o f time before another terrorist attack occurs
Relieved about the progress that has been made in fighting Al-Qaeda

Need for Evaluation Scale
1 extremely uncharacteristic
2 somewhat uncharacteristic
3 uncertain
4 somewhat characteristic
5 extremely characteristic
1. I form opinions about everything
2. I prefer to avoid taking extreme positions
3. It is very important for me to hold strong opinions
4. I want to know exactly what is good and bad about everything
5. I often prefer to remain neutral about complex issues
6. If something does not affect me, I do not usually determine if it is good or bad
7. I enjoy strongly liking and disliking new things
8. There are many things for which I do not have a preference
9. It bothers me to remain neutral
1 0.1 like to have strong opinions even when I am not personally involved
1 1.1 have many more opinions than the average person
12.1 would rather have a strong opinion than no opinion at all
13.1 pay a lot o f attention to whether things are good or bad
14.1 only form strong opinions if I have to
15.1 like to decide that new things are really good or bad
1 6 .1 am pretty much indifferent to many important issues

Brief Mood Introspection Scale - Trait
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Now, we are going to ask you about your moods in general. We want to know what
kinds o f mood you feel most often.
INSTRUCTIONS: Choose the response on the scale that indicates how well each
adjective or phrase describes how you usually feel
1 = I never feel this way on a regular basis
2 - 1 rarely feel this way on a regular basis
3 = Sometimes I feel this way on a regular basis
4 = 1 frequently feel this way on a regular basis
17. Lively
a. (1)1 never feel this way on a regular basis
b. (2) I rarely feel this way on a regular basis
c. (3) Sometimes I feel this way on a regular basis
d. (4) I frequently feel this way on a regular basis
18. Happy
a. Etc.
19. Sad
20. Tired
21. Caring
22. Content
23. Gloomy
24. Jittery
25. Drowsy
26. Grouchy
27. Peppy
28. Nervous
29. Calm
30. Loving
31. Fed-up
32. Active
On a regular basis, my mood is usually:
Very unpleasant
. Very Pleasant
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Brief Big Five Personality Measure
Here are a number o f personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please chose a
number for each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree that the
statement describes you. You should rate the extent to which the pair o f traits applies to
you, even if one characteristic applies more strongly than the other.
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strongly
disagree

1

moderately
disagree

neither agree
nor disagree

2

moderately
agree

3

4

I myself as:
1.

Extraverted, enthusiastic

2.

Critical, quarrelsome

3.

Dependable, self-disciplined

4.

Anxious, easily upset

5.

Open to new experiences, complex

6.

Reserved, quiet

7.

Sympathetic, warm

8.

Disorganized, careless

9.

Calm, emotionally stable

10._____ Conventional, uncreative

Miller Behavioral Style Scale
Permission not granted to reprint.

Demographic Questionnaire
Some further questions about you
1. Demographics
a. 1. What is your gender?
i. Male
ii. Female
iii. Transgendered
b. 2. How old are you?
c. 3. What best describes your year in college?
i. Freshman
ii. Sophomore
iii. Junior
iv. Senior
V. Graduate
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strongly
agree

5

vi. Other (including non-degree)
d. 4. What term best describes you?
i. Caucasian (white)
ii. African-American
iii. Asian-American
iv. Native American
v. Other
e. 5. Are you o f Hispanic descent?
i. Yes
ii. No
f. 6. Have you lived the majority o f your life in the United States?
i. Yes
ii. No
g. 7. If not, how long ago did you move to the United States?
i. Y ears_____
ii. Months
h. 8. Is English your first language?
i. Yes
ii. No
i. 9. Which o f the following statements best describes where your permanent
(home) address is?
i. Southern New Hampshire
ii. Central New Hampshire
iii. Northern New Hampshire
iv. Massachusetts
v. Rhode Island
vi. Connecticut
vii. Vermont
viii. Another State outside o f New England
ix. Another country
j. 10. Do other family members (such as parents and siblings) live at that
address?
i. Yes
ii. No
2. Manipulation check
a. 11. Before today, did you know that there is a nuclear power plant in
Seabrook, New Hampshire?
i. Yes
ii. No
b. 12. Do you know anyone who works at the Seabrook Nuclear Facility?
i. Yes
ii. No
c. 13. Have you ever been to the Seabrook Nuclear Facility?
i. Yes
ii. No
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d. 14. Before today, how much would you say you knew about nuclear
power?
i. Very little
ii. A little
iii. A fair amount
iv. A lot
v. Enough to be considered an expert
e. 15. Before today, how concerned were you about the safety o f nuclear
power plants?
i. Not concerned at all
ii. A little concerned
iii. Moderately concerned
iv. Very concerned
v. Extremely concerned
f. 16. After reading the articles in this study, how concerned are you about
the safety o f nuclear power plants?
i. Not concerned at all
ii. A little concerned
iii. Moderately concerned
iv. Very concerned
v. Extremely concerned
g. 17. Do you think an accident is likely to occur at Seabrook Nuclear Power
Plant?
i. Not at all likely
ii. Somewhat likely
iii. Moderately likely
iv. Very likely
v. Extremely likely
h. 18. Do you think a terrorist attack is likely to occur at Seabrook Nuclear
Power Plant?
i. Not at all likely
ii. Somewhat likely
iii. Moderately likely
iv. Very likely
v. Extremely likely
i. 19. Generally, how believable was the information on the website that you
read today for this study?
i. Not at all believable
ii. Somewhat believable
iii. Moderately believable
iv. Very believable
v. Extremely believable
j. 20. Generally, how realistic was the website that you read today for the
study?
i. Not at all realistic
ii. Somewhat realistic
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iii. Moderately realistic
iv. Very realistic
v. Extremely realistic
3. Media Consumption
a. 21. Generally, how much time do you spend a day watching television
n ew s?
minutes
b. 22. How much time do you spend a day reading about the news on internet
w ebsites?
minutes
c. 23. How much time do you spend listening to the news on the radio?
minutes
d. 24. When you are reading, listening to, or watching the news, what section
do you pay the most attention to?
i. Local news
ii. US news
iii. International news
iv. Sports
v. Entertainment news
vi. Politics
vii. Health and Science
viii. Business
ix. Travel
x. Education
xi. Other
e. 25. What information source do you rely on most to learn about current
events?
i. Television
ii. Internet
iii. Radio
iv. Talking to friends and family
v. College or University classes
vi. Other source
4. Political demographics
a. 26. Have you ever voted?
i. Yes
ii. No
b. 27. If you have voted, have you ever voted for a Democratic candidate?
i. Yes
ii. No
c. 28. If you have voted, have you ever voted for a Republican candidate?
i. Yes
ii. No
d. 29. If you have voted, have you ever voted for an independent candidate?
i. Yes
ii. No
e. 30. If you have voted, have you ever voted for a Green Party candidate?
i. Yes
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ii. No
f. 31. Which political party do you tend to agree with more?
i. Democratic Party
ii. Republican Party
iii. Neither
iv. I don’t know
g. 32. Which o f the following terms best characterizes your political beliefs?
i. Very liberal
ii. Liberal
iii. Middle o f the road
iv. Conservative
v. Very conservative
vi. I don’t know
h. 33. Insert party affiliation measure here -w aiting for scales
5. Do you have any thoughts about this study that you think the experimenters
would find useful? Please share them with us here!:
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